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BSTBOIWCTIOH
the Problem
Contemporary c r i t io e  a r t  n e t h e s ita n t to  admit th a t  th t  
a r t  they profess t t  follow  hao few, I f  any, r u l ta  or oanons which 
could serve a t  a th e o re tic a l baaia  fo r th o ir  c ritic ism .*  At tha 
same t i n t ,  t h t i r  a tt i tu d e  towards philosophers ia  one o f scep ti­
cism. th is  ootid  b t t h t  rtaaoa  fo r  th e ir  f a i lu re  to  provide 
th o ir  own a r t  w ith th t  th ao ro tie a l baaia i t  ao sorely  lacks*
But i t  ia  a lee  p eee lb lt th a t  tha  philosophers from when tha 
t r i t i e a  n igh t reasonably expeet aent help,have no help  to  g ive. 
Whichever t f  these two explanation* i t  the r ig h t  one, i t  remains 
th a t  the o r i t io a  must oarry  on w ithout the  b e n e fit o f knowing 
p rec ise ly  what th e i r  a r t  i a ,  what r u l ta  th e i r  c ritic ism s  must 
fo llow ,or teen  i f  th e i r  profession ia  m y  a r t  a t  a ll*  Despite 
th is  condition , unanimity among o r i t io a  as to  what c o n s titu te s  
th e i r  a r t  ia  a desideratum fo r whieh seme o f  them sin cere ly  hope.
Assuming the  ro le  o f reagen t, Hr Christopher fry  has 
reminded the  dram atis o r i t io a  o f the  necessity  o f  a t  le a s t  a 
teamen s ta r tin g  p o in t.
*1 th in k " , he w rite s , "what X am most anxious
*W.F. fh ra l l  and Mdison H ibbart, A Handbook o f L iter*  
sto re  (SOw York* Odyssey P ress, 1986), pp. I b ^ l f e l .  " ^One who 
even among. . . o r i t io a ,  hopes to  find  an agreement and synthesis 
as to  the nature o f c r it ic ism  -  hopes, in  sh o rt, to  find  tru th  * 
ia  loot* there  are no standards to  which a l l  c r i t i c s  subscribe, 
a fa c t whieh may seem discouraging to  the beginner but which i s  
a f te r  a l l ,  the  very l i f e  o f  c r i t ic is m .”
1
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to  do here 1» to  otk th a t c r it ic ism  should 
look more deeply in to  tho nature o f a p lay , 
end to  pursue tho roooen fo r  i to  na tu re , ra th e r 
than to  t r y  to  foroo i t  in to  « category to  
ohioh i t  d oesn 't boleng. I f  « c r it ic ism  lo 
to  ho understood and p ro fited  by. w rite r  and 
o r i t io  oust o to r t  fro® the l o o  prem iss."2
Mr ITy io  reco ilin g  the  e r ltio s*  a tte n tio n  to  tho prlmsey o f the  
work in  the a r t  o f c r i t ic ism . Ho advoeatea th a t  tho c r i t i c  re­
tu rn  to  an awareness of h ia  ob liga tions by judging in  eon fe ra ity  
w ith tho work o f  a r t ,  and not aeeordlng to  the preeenoeptions of 
the o r i t i o .  lie ine io to  th a t  un less tho o r i t io  " s ta r t  from tho 
seme prowls** ae tho w rito r , then there  can be no p ro fita b le  nor 
adequate c r it ic ism . tho o r i t io  ought to  "look wore deeply in to  
the nature o f a play and to  pureue the  roaoon fo r i to  n a tu re ."3* 
In o ther worde, Mr Iky lo  auggootlng, fro® the view-point of 
tho playw right, th a t tho o r i t io  s tr iv e  aero heaootly  in  h ie  
e tte a p ts  to  wake oontaet w ith the whole ploy, both in  i t a  extea* 
cion and in  i to  depthe. When the o r i t io  hoe done th is  then , a t  
le a n t tho f i r e t  condition fo r a v a lid  e r i t le ie a t  w ill bo p resen t.
l e t  us now c a l l  on another w itness who, lik e  Mr fry ,
a f f i r a s  tho necessity  o f  a women po in t-de-depart.
I t  i s  tho view of 1 M arltain th a t the o r i t io  i s  no t free
to  do whatever ho pleases in  h is  a r t  o f  c r i t ic ism . On the con­
t r a ry ,  he must be guided p rim arily  by th e  work to  be Judged. I f
^Christopher Bry, An Experience o f C r it ic s  (Sew York*
Oxford U niversity  P ress, I 'feS), pp. klS-i’h'..........
* Ib ld .
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8tha o r i t io  Ignores th is  basio to a s t  and proceeds to judge tho work 
from h is  own boat o f mind, than , undsr suoh olreumstanees tha 
o r i t io  doss not Judge tha work of a r t ,  but ra th e r i t  ia  ha who i s  
judged by i t . *  H M aritain maintains th a t tha o r i t io  before 
judging of the work as to  i t s  way of execution must d issever tha 
o res tiva  in ten tio n s from whieh i t  proseads and the most see rs t 
th ings whieh s t i r r e d  the soul of the au th o r.6 The o r i t io ,  th e re ­
fo re , as fa r  as M M aritain  i s  oonoeraed, i s  very much removed 
from the bland indifference of a mere observer who passes judg­
ment while standing on the o u tsid e . For M M aritain **• • .the  
o r i t io  i s  a poet and has the  g if ts  of a poet, a t le a s t v ir tu a l­
ly ."*  In t h i s ,  lik e  P lato7, he affirm s th a t  e r l t io i s a  whieh has 
not f i r s t  been a ttra o te d  by the rings of in sp ira tio n  and invaded 
by the same madness which Is  in  tha poet, i s  in  no way v a lid .8
*Jacques M aritain , Raison a t Raisons (Paris * E gloff, 1947), 
p . 89. "Sous jugerons I ’eeuvra '4 '*a^-eflame un objet qui nous 
ea t sounds, a t  dent no tre  d isp o sitio n  d’e sp r i t  ea t la  mssure. 
in  p a re il eas , a  v ra i d ire , nous ne jugeons pas 1‘oeuvre’ d*art, 
o ’s s t  nous qui sommes juges par e l l e . "
6Jacques M aritain , Creative In tu itio n  in  Art and Poetry 
(lew York* Pantheon, 1955)7""p. "S ii.   ' ""r'rrT""M ■ 1 '      *"
6 Ib id .
^Vfda P la to , Ian, 553e-554b, t r a a a . 5 . Jow ett, in  The 
Dialogues' of P la te  (Sew York* Random House, 1937), I ,  289.
^Jacques M aritain , ib id . ,  pp. 85-86. " . . . s o  th a t ,  fo r
P la to , any e f fo r t  o f ra tio n a l c ritic ism  remains inadequate i f  
only ra t io n a l , and necessarily  presupposes the in tu itiv e  
reoeption, in  the unconscious of the soul, of the magnetic 
power conveyed by the poem."
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4There ought to  he, f i r e t  of e l l ,  an In sp ira tio n  whieh the  o r i t io  
experiences frost the work and whioh enables him to  grasp the 
o r eat i re  in tu it io n  of the a r t i s t  displayed in  h is work* Qttoe the 
in tu it io n  is  grasped by the o r i t io  then he i s  competent to  judge
the work. So, above a l l ,  the o r i t io  i s  dependent upon the work
to  be judged as h is  i n i t i a l  point of departure.
In  these remarks, both Mr Fry and M M aritain have rendered 
o ritio ism  a valuable service by observing th a t  i t  is  not ju s t  an 
a rb itra ry  a f f a i r  dependant so le ly  an th e  whins of the o r i t io a .  
la th e r  i t  begins w ith a  work to  be judged. Moreover, i f  as M 
M aritain s ta te s  the o r i t io  is  a poet, a t  le a s t v ir tu a lly , then 
the ru les of a r t  whioh are derived from an understanding of what
a r t  i s ,  w ill  be the same ru les employed by the o r i t io s  in  h is  a r t
of o r i tie le su
But these  remarks, valuable as they are in  describing 
the ac tu a l conditions and aims of contemporary o r i t io s  and the 
ideal whioh th e ir  a r t  should f u l f i l l ,  do not answer the important 
question! who i s  to  say what the  work of a r t  is?  However, they 
do suggest th a t whoever i s  able to  say what poetry i s ,  is  a lso  
able to  say what c r it ic ism  i s .  And, what is  more, they suggest 
th a t i f  there  is  a philosophy of poetry , there  is  a lso  a philosophy 
of c r it ic ism .
Yet, i f  there  Is  sueh a philosophy is  i t  to  be found 
among the philosophers who have given the  o r i t io s  reasons fo r
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6th e i r  scepticism ? I t  1* one o f tho purposes o f th is  th e s is  to  
she* th a t i t  cannot ho* Tho o r i t io s  oust f i r s t ,  however, he 
assured th a t  the  one th ing  whioh would s t i f l e  th e ir  u tterances 
and whioh they fsa r  n e s t from the philosophers should not he 
forced on then , namelyt a ra tio n a liz a tio n  o f th e ir  a r t .  In fo o t, 
the philosophy whieh they nay expeot to  provide a th e o re tic a l 
ground fo r  e r l t i e i s n  and fo r poetry  w ist recognise the  absurdity  
o f ra tio n a lis in g  e ith e r  poetry or c r it ic ism  in to  mechanical 
formulae. B u t,a t the sane t im e ,i t  must affirm  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f 
ru le s .
However, contemporary o r i t io s ,  in  th e i r  e f fo r t  to  free  
themselves from the ra tio n a lisa tio n s  th a t are a lien  to  th e i r  a r t ,  
e lim inate the  conditions under which ru le s  are possib le . But i s  
th is  the f a u l t  o f tho c r i t i c s  themselves? To say, in  o ffo o t, th a t 
c r i t ic ism  is  c r it ic ism  only when i t  succeeds in  lib e ra tin g  i t s e l f  
from reason and, in c id en ta lly , from ru les  i s  a philosophical 
statem ent. I f  th is  i s  so , i t  i s  no t the  f a u l t  of o r i t io s  qua 
c r i t i c s  bu t e f  c r i t i c s  who take to  philosophizing. In o ther words, 
to  r id  e r l t i e i s n  o f philosophy th a t  would contaminate i t ,  they have 
adopted or elaborated ja philosophy which paradoxically  p ro tec ts  i t  
from philosophy. Conceivably, then , the  c r i t i c s  should welcome a 
philosophy which would d ign ify  th e i r  a r t  w ith  ru les  w ithout the 
f a ta l  ra t io n a liz a tio n s •
This means th a t  the oppositions which are the accepted 
bases fo r the exclusion of philosophy from e r l t i e i s n  mast be
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6reso lved . The a b s tra c t,  fee neecssary , fee s c ie n t i f ic ,  the 
lo g ica l and the r a t io n a l  elements associated w ith philosophy mast 
he reconciled  w ife fee co n cre te , the contingent, fee poetic  and 
the In tu it iv e  elements found in  c r it ic ism . Is  such a re c o n c ilia ­
tio n  possib le? I s  there  a philosophy capable o f resolving these  
oppositions? On a t  l e a s t  one issu e  to  which theae oppositions 
can he reduced, fee answer to these questions i s  a ff irm a tiv e .
This issue  i s  th a t  of the re la tio n  between fee speculative and 
fee j r a o t ic a l .  For the Ancients? th e o re tic a l knowledge was not 
only possible bu t was necessary fo r  an understanding of the very 
p rac tice  of m  a r t .  In  f a c t ,  yflBORgjOflP . the Greek verb to  se e , 
to  'behold, © to., whieh corresponds to  th e  ia t i t i  oon teap larl. 
c a rried  w ife  i t  a  c e r titu d e  which J»M in  fee  specu la tive  order 
as w ell as th e  p ra c t ic a l ,  Concerning the possible app lica tion  of 
such knowledge A ris to tle  wrote in  fee P h y s lc a ^ i * ...w » sh a ll 
take as ac tual t h a t  whieh i s  th e o re tic a lly  p o ss ib le ...s in c e  fee 
ease assumed Is  th e o re tic a lly  possible and the assumption o f the 
th e o re tic a lly  possib le case ought not to  give r i s e  to any im-
?This term s ig n if ie s ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  the philosopher*
Aristotle fed i t  Thomas.
!®Vide Oresk-lSnslish Lwd.eon, ed . 1 . 0 .  l ld d e l l  end o th er s ,
2nd e d . " W w T » T ^ ^ t T O i : V  6 3 6 , col* c.
^ i r t e t o t l e ,  P tya ica , V III , 8 lftb & 4 fcM 9 tw ins. K  P. Jferdia and 
ft. 1 , Gaya, In  Tfen'i ^ ¥ % o r k s  of A r is to tle , ed. lieb ard  HolCaon (Hmr 
fo rte  Sandora " "
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tpossib le  re su lt*  I f  tlw  theory I t  t ru e . But whet l«  nor* Inpor- 
ta u t  I t  to  understand th a t  from th t  f r a s t l e a l  a a t ls i ty  o f  pootry 
and o r t i lo ia n ,  no th so ro tio a l knowledge ta n  ha iuned ia ts ly  dariuad. 
fhm f u t i l i t y  a f  aueh a prooedurs i t  no doubt responsible fe r  sons 
o f  tha in d iffs ren se  to  a possib le th e o re tic a l baaia fo r th a  a r t  e f  
poetry and I ta  o r i t io  Ian .
fbora ia  a t i i i  another ground on whioh tha opposition o f 
philosophy and pootry nay bo reso lved . Philosophy, tra d i t io n a lly  
gluon to  defin ition#  and pootry dediettted to  i to  a r t  are happily
a r t  found in
Arehibaid M«eLel»h»* pesn Aro Peotioa .I^
k peso should bo palpabla and wuto 
As a glebed f r u i t
Duuib
An old  nadalilona to  tha  thunt
S ilan t ao th a  aloeve-wern sheas 
Of oaaonant ledges where tha  b o s s  has
grown
A peon should bo wordless 
to  a f l ig h t  o f  b ird s
... •»•
A jmmhb *hould b* stohlaalass in time 
i s  tha  noon s i  Inbt
^ in s r l s a n  Poetry and Prose, ad . Wermm I te ra to r , 8rd ad* 
(CMobrldist M w si 'd o  '^ e a a , T » 4 7), p . 1 402.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8leaving «« th e  m m  re lease*
Twig by M g  tho night-entangled t r e e s ,
Leaving, a t  th t  moon behind t h t  w inter 
leaves.
Memory by memory the mind -
A poera should bo motionless in  time 
M  the  m m  elimbs
•** •••
A poem should b t equal to*
Hot tru e
Ih r a l l  the h is to ry  of g r ie f  
An empty doorway an i a maple lo a f
for loo t
fh t loaning grasses and two l ig h ts  above 
the sea -
A poem should ne t moan 
But b e .
Paradoxically , in  advocating mute pootry whieh needs no explane- 
t io n , Mr Maobsish shows a t  e ase , and in  a very eloquent manner, 
the  need fo r  p rin c ip le s  whioh would male* h is  pootry understandable. 
h i i s ,  ia  o f f s e t ,  pointing out tho need fo r understanding pootry 
in  terms o f  the very being o f pootry . S la te  a poem belongs to  the 
speeial universe o f a r t ,  i t  i s  in  terms of th a t  universe th a t  i t  
i s  to  bo understood. Tho b a s is  fo r  as in te l l ig ib le  understanding 
o f poetry , th e re fo re , would be found in  discovering what poetry 
i s .  But in  doing th is ,w e must in  no way v io la te  what Mr MaeLelsh 
has said eoneeming the  d is tin c tiv e  being o f  the poem. Hero, 
then , i s  a poet unw ittingly  giving testim ony to  the need fo r a
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9philosophy o f  poetry , a t  th« same tim e, aokaowladging th a t  I t  
would be h o tte r  to  haw  a© explanation i f  an explanation meant 
ra tio n a lis in g  h ie  poetry* Along w ith the  o r i t io s ,  the  poets m e t  
ho tsiu red  th a t  there  ie  a philosophy whioh can d ispe l th e i r  fea r 
o f  ra tio n a lisa tio n *  The e labo ration  o f a th e o re tic a l d e fin itio n  
and ru le* , does not n ecessa rily  prejudice the nature of th e  work 
to  be done* On tho con tra ry , th is  philosophy would proride the  
M ans fo r  an in te l l ig ib le  understanding o f poetry  and i t s  
c r it ic ism  w ithout Jeopardising tho l i f e  o f e ith e r  one.
However, fh rth ar q u a lif ic a tio n s  are necessary to  estab - 
l i s h  our th e s i s . In a l l  o f  th i s  whioh has gone before we are a n ti­
c ipa ting  a so lu tion  suggested by W M aritain , namelyi th a t i t  i s  ia  
the  philosophy o f nature th a t  a theory o f a r t  ia  to  be found,I s
ISjaequea M aritain , An Introduction to  Philosophy, iro n s . 
W«X«Watkin (Warn Yorki Shaed am& W ar d ' I’# # ) , 1 p» “S’f #,'"»* 1 , "The 
te rn  aesthe tie* '’ w rites M M aritain , a lluding  to  the  philosophy of 
a r t M•••would be doubly ineorreo t h e re . Modern w rite rs  understand 
by the word the theory o f  beauty and o f a r t ,  as though the philo­
sophy o f mrlHEinm'lim p liaks'W  whieKTso 'tre a t questions oonoerning 
beauty oonsldered in  I t s e l f  (suoh questions belong to  ontology), 
wad as though a r t  were confined to  tho fin e  a r ts  (a mistake which 
v i t ia te s  the  e n tire  theory o f  a r t ) .  Moreover, the word aoetho tles 
I s  derived e ty ae leg io a lly  from s e n s ib i l i ty  (AXSTKAKOMAZ w' 
whereas a r t ,  and beauty a lso , are m atters o f the in te l le c t ,  qu ite  
as much as o f feeling*
Scholastic  te x t  books do not u su a lly  deveto a separate 
treatise te the philosophy of art, and either atudy its problems 
in  psychology alone, o r ,  the b a tte r  to  explain the concept o f 
prudence, in  e th ic s . I t  would be necessary to  c la s s ify  the  
philosophy o f a r t ,  l ik e  e th ic s  i t s e l f ,  under na tu ra l philosophy.
I f  we kept to  the single standpoint o f the  sp ee ifiea tlo n  o f the  
solenses by th e i r  formal o b jec t,* And he repeats on p* 2Tli 
* . . , l f  th e  philosophic sciences are c la s s if ie d  from the stand­
poin t o f  th o ir  speeifie  eh arae te r, e th ic s , which t r e a ts  o f the
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But IS M aritain ha* elaborated m  such philosophy. 14 I t  remain* 
th e re fo re , to  inquire in to  the domain of na tu ra l philosophy and 
to  eee on what th is  a sse rtio n  ©f M Maritain** is  based.
At the o u tse t, i t  would be p ro fita b le  to  asks Does th i*  
apparently neglected f ie ld  o f na tu ra l philosophy qua lify  a* a 
aeieno# whieh might provide a th e o re tic a l basis  to  c ritic ism ?  The 
answer to  th i*  question requ ires th a t we consider the subject* 
m atter o f the  philosophy o f aatur®. How w ell q u a lified  the 
philosophy o f nature ia  to  deal w ith th is  problem i s  di*ou*»*d 
in  the next chap ter.
moral v irtue*  and whose formal object ie  human action* and the 
philosophy of a r t , whioh t r e a ts  o f the p ra o tlc a i" in te lle c tu a l 
v irtue*  and whose formal ob ject i s  human making, are  division* 
of the science of man, which i t s e l f  beloaks' 'lo na tu ra l philoaophy 
(though i t  enter*  also in to  metaphysics).*
l*Hls works. Art and Scholasticism , tr im s. J .P . Seanlan 
(Hew Yorki Scribner, l9&6'),"Ari' t ra n s . B.de P. Matthew*
(New York* Philosophical L ibrary ,’ rI l i¥ T 'r ~lrt and Fhlth, tran * .
John Coleman (Hew York* Jhllosophloal L ibrary , 1948J contain  
answer* to  many speelflo  problems In a r t  but no attem pt 1* made In 
any o f these works to  implement the suggestive statem ent made la  
An Introduction to  Philosophy and quoted above. His most recen t
Poetry (New York* Pantheon, 
1963), again deals wl'tlhi'' spcell'lo" prohiejM in  a r t  but leaves the 
statem ent concerning the  p o s s ib il i ty  of a theory of a r t ,  rooted 
In the  philosophy o f na tu re , unanswered.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
I I
THE PHILOSOPHY OP NATURE
According to  the perennial philosophy, na tu ra l philosophy 
has for i t s  d is tin c tiv e  o b jec t, the being o f sensible mobile 
bodies, ens m obile. I t  i s  the  purpose o f th is  chapter to  d is­
cuss what the p rin c ip le s  o f the science of mobile being are and 
to  explain  the p rin c ip le s  and/or causes o f corporeal th ings.^
The P rincip les
A ris to tle , who is  acknowledged as the  founder o f the 
philosophy o f  na tu re , po in ts out a t the beginning o f  the  
Physlca th a t  every organised body of knowledge s ta r ts  w ith 
c e r ta in  p rin c ip les  whieh are determined by the su b jeo t-n a tte r 
under d iscussion . Tho S ta g ir ite  s ta te s 2 t " . . . i n  the  science
l i t  must be noticed here th a t  there  are  two orders involved 
in  any science, one in  whieh re a l p rin c ip le s  and/or causes are 
f i r s t  and the o ther in  whieh the  p rin c ip le s  o f  the science are 
f i r s t  as causing the knowledge o f conclusions. Vide St Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologies (Ottawai Inpensis S tu liT  Gonerails O .P r., 
1941), X .^ .S .a d  1 . *Dioendum quod in  aoeipiendo so ic n tiaa  non 
semper p rln c ip la  e t  elementa sunt p r io ra , quia quandoque Ox 
c ffec tlb u s sen sib ilib u s dovoniraus in  oognltlonem prinoipiorum 
e t  oausarum in te lle g ib iliu m . Sod in  coaplemento sc ien tlae  semper 
effeotuum dependet ex oegnitiene prinoipiorum e t  elementeruni 
quia, u t  ibidem d ie i t  Philosophus, tunc opinamur no* s c ire ,  cum 
p rin o ip ia  possumns in  causes reso lv ere .
2A ris to tle , Physlca, 184a 14-16.
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o f na tu re , as in  e ther tranches o f study, our f i r s t  task  w ill  he 
to  t r y  to  determine what re la te s  to  i t s  principles.** Elsewhere 
he defines p rin c ip le8 as B...som ething th a t  i s  f i r s t  from whioh 
something e i th e r  i s  or beoomes or i s  known."
The philosophy o f na tu re , th e re fo re , seeks the f i r s t  
p rinc ip les  o f whieh oorporeal mobile to d ie s  are composed. U se , 
the causes involved in  the process o f m obility  are considered be­
cause from the d e lib e ra tio n  o f the  p rin c ip les  o f mobile being 
natu ra l philosophy a rriv es  a t  the notion o f cause. "Everything," 
says A ris to tle , " th a t changes i s  something and i s  changed by some­
th ing  and in to  something."4 Generally cause i s  th a t which i s  
necessary fo r the coming-to-be o f a  thing.® So the philosophy of 
nature deals w ith the p rin c ip le s  of nature and a knowledge o f the  
causes o f  th in g s .
In attem pting to  determine what the  f i r s t  p rin c ip le s  of 
na tu ra l philosophy might be, A ris to tle  observes that*  " . . . f i r s t  
p rin c ip les  must not be derived from one another nor from anything 
e ls e , while everything has to  be derived from them. But these 
conditions are f u l f i l l e d  by the primary c o n tra rie s , which are 
not derived from anything e lse  because they are primary,nor from
8A ris to tle , Metaphysica, 1013a 17.
* Ib ld . ,  1069h36•
6A ris to tle , Physlca, 194b23.
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each o ther because they are c o n tra r ie s ."6
tha fac t th a t  tha f i r s t  p rin c ip le s  o f oorporaal mobile 
being are oo n tra ries  ha concludes also from an examination of 
generation .7 That from whioh a th ing  Is  generated most laok tha 
natura o f tha th ing  generated, otherw ise.>th a t  th ing  would have 
already ex isted  and would not therefo re  be generated. A th ing , 
consequently, i s  generated out o f i t s  opposite, or con tra ry .
As a r e s u l t ,  every generation involves oon tra ries and therefore  
soma oon traries must be f i r s t  p r ln o ip la s .8
Rrom these considera tions, A risto tle  concludes th a t  
c o n tra rie s  must make the two f i r s t  p rin c ip le s  o f the philosophy 
of nature* But there  must be more than two p rin c ip le s  because 
c o n tra rie s  cannot ac t upon one another but only upon some th ird  
th in g . Tims he concludes, "The same Is  tru e  o f any other pa ir 
o f c o n tra r ie s | for Love dees not gather S tr ife  together and make 
th ings out of i t ,  nor does S tr ife  make anything out o f Love, but 
both ac t on a th ird  th ing  d if fe re n t from b o th .”9 So oon traries 
could not eadst un less they were in  something. Sew since 
co n tra rie s  do e x is t  and are generated i t  must be assumed th a t 
besides the primary oon traries some primary substance whieh is
6Ib id .,  138a 26-29.
7Ib id . , 188b 21-26.
8Ib id .,  189a 10.
9Ib id .,  189a 24-26.
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uth o ir  substratum and liko  thorn a f i r s t  p rin c ip le  mast e x is t .
This A ris to tle  s ta te s  in  the following way* "there v a s t always 
be an underlying substance namely th a t  whioh becomes, and th a t 
t h i s ,  though always one num erically, in  form a t  le a s t  i s  not 
one."10 "P la in ly , then , i f  there  are conditions and p rincip les 
which co n s titu te  na tu ra l ob jec ts and from whioh they prim arily  
are or have come to  be * have some to  be, I  swan, what each is  
sa id  to  be in  i t s  e sse n tia l n a tu re • • •everything comes to  be from 
both subject and form ."H  He concludes therefo re  th a t  the number 
o f  the  f i r s t  p rin c ip le s  o f na tu ra l ob jec ts whioh are subject to  
generation are th re e , fo r  " i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  there  must be a 
substratum for the  oon tra ries and th a t  the oon tra ries must be 
two."1H However he adds th a t  the  c o n tra rie s  need not be two in  
the  sense o f two d is t in c t  forms fo r  one con trary  w ill serve to  
e ffe c t the change by i t s  successive absence and presence. IS
A risto tle  has now sta ted  the number o f the p rin c ip le s  of 
na tu ra l th ings which are required  in  generation. To the  substratum 
he gives the name m atter, to  the  con trary  regarded as present in  
the m atter the name form, and to  th e  absence of th is  form from
10Ib id .,  190a 14-18.
11Ib id . ,  190b 16-20.
12Ib id .,  190b 24-25.
12ib id . , 191a 8-2 .
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the  m atter,the  ns»e jgrlvm tlea.l*  These are the  th ree  primary 
p rin c ip le s  of the generation o f na tu ra l substances* The m atter 
ie  the sub ject or substratum) the form and the  p rivation  whioh 
i s  the leek  o f  form in  m atter, are the o o n tra rie s . Thus in  
every generation or change seme m atter, lacking a c e r ta in  form 
aoquires th a t  form. Throughout tho generation,the m atter per­
s i s t s  , having f i r s t  one form then another. I t  is  fo r th is  reason 
th a t A ris to tle  describes m atter as "the primary substratum of 
eaeh th in g , from whioh i t  eemes to  be w ithout q u a lif ic a tio n  and 
whioh p e rs is ts  in  the resu lt.*!®  "By form," he w rite s , " I  mean 
the essence of eaeh th ing  and i t s  primary substance."!6 The form 
o f  na tu ra l th ings however, does not p e rs is t  but in  every change 
a form i s  replaced by i t s  con trary .
This analysis o f ohange explains how nothing eemes to  be 
simply from being or simply from non-being) but ra th e r , th ings 
come from something whieh i s ,  a t  once, re la tiv e  being and re la tiv e  
non-being. This i s  a substanee w ith p r iv a tio n .!7 This substratum 
Is  being inasmuch as i t  i s  something) but i t  i s  non-being inasmuch
Id jjr ia to tle , Metaphysics, 1070b 18-19$ * . . . there  are th ree
p rin c ip le s  -  the form the p riv a tio n , and the m atter.*
!® A risto tle, Fhysloa. 192aS0-81.
1®A ris to tle , Metaphysics, I032bl.
17 A ris to tle , Physio a , 191b 14, * . . . a  th ing  may *00100 to  be
from what i s  not* -“Ih aF T s in  a q u a lified  sense* For a th ing  comes 
to  be from the p r iv a tio n , whioh in  i t s  own nature i s  non-being.
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as I t  is  mot tha being th a t acmes from it*  simoo i t  looks tho 
form of th a t being. In short* as A ris to tle  says ia  tho 
Metaphysioa* " a l l  things come to  he out of th a t which is* hut 
i s  p o te n tia lly , wad i s  not a c tu a lly ."* 8
This A ris to te lia n  so lu tion  to  the problem of change 
a rise s  out of the d is tin c tio n  made between the p rin c ip le s  of 
mobile being, between subject and fo ra . I t  holds th a t every 
mobile being has two e sse n tia l constituen t p rinc ip les! a 
su b stan tia l subject whioh is  ca lled  prime m atter and i t s  per­
fec tio n  or ao t whioh Is  ca lled  su b s tan tia l form. This analysis 
of ens mobile is  ca lled  the hylomorphio theory . I t  i s  the 
fundamental doctrine of the philosophy of na tu re .
This doctrine recognizes th a t a l l  corporeal bodies are 
oonstitu ted  of the two-fold p rinc ip les  prime matter and sub­
s ta n tia l  form.*® These p rinc ip les  o o n stitu te  the very essence 
of mobile being. They are in tr in s ic  f i r s t  p rin c ip les  whioh do 
not a r is e  from others nor from one another. Prime m atter is
*8A ris to tle , Metaphysioa 1069b 19-20. For A ris to tle  
change takes place a n l i a  'every change something comes to  be 
from something e ls e .  Ho oonsidered th a t before change, the 
being from which the  change s ta r te d  not only was what i t  was 
but sms able to  become something e ls e .  What a th ing i s  A ris to tle  
c a l ls  a c tu a l i ty ! i t s  capacity  to  become something e ls e ,  he c a lls  
jpo ten t'la illy l
Ip
These remarks are dogmatically s ta te d . For aa account 
based on A ris to tle  and St Thomas vide K* Dougherty, Cosmology 
(Poekskill* Sraymoor Press, 1952), pp. 102-122.
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the purely  determinable su b s tan tia l p rin c ip le  in  the essence 
o f mobile being, fhe e ther p rin o lp le , su b s tan tia l form, 
determines the f i r s t  s e t  e f m atter, fheso are the in tr in s io  
p rino ip les ©f mobile being qua mobile.
According t© A ris to tle  prime m atter eonsidered 
p o s itiv e ly  i s  the  f i r s t  sub ject o f whieh a th ing  i s  made, 
fhe term "sub ject” s ig n if ie s  th a t  from which or out o f whieh 
a  th ing  i s  made, th a t i s  to  say the primary su b s tra te .
Prime m atter i s  the  f i r s t  su b stan tia l p r in c ip le  from whioh 
every mobile being i s  made in  i t s  escenesj but i t  oannot e x is t  
except in  conjunction with su b s tan tia l form. Fbrm, on the 
other hand, i s  th a t  by whioh a th ing  i s  what i t  i s  and not 
something e ls e .  Dor th is  reason form i s  oa iled  act because 
i t  co n s titu te s  and determines a th ing  in  a c e rta in  mods 
o f being, fhe m atter i s  the  common element whioh remains 
while ferns appear and d isappear. In changeable being*sub­
s ta n tia l  form is  properly defined as the  f i r s t  act o f prime 
m atter. I t  i s  c a lle d  ac t because i t  i s  the  determining 
p rincip le  in  sioblle being. Substantial form i s  the p rin c ip le  
of sp ec ifica tio n  o f  being and the f i r s t  p rin c ip le  o f operation. 
Therefore, matter and form ( th a t is, prime matter and 
su b s tan tia l form) are to  be conceived of as two oo-prinolples 
which are n a tu ra lly  ordinated fo r su b s tan tia l union and 
whieh c o n s titu te  a complete bodily  substance, an e x is tin g
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n a tu re .20
Generation and Corruption .    I. fn ■ LI.HIW
fhe generation and oorruptlon of th ings aro rendered 
in te l l ig ib le  by theso p rin c ip les  o f mobile being . In the  process 
o f coming in to  being, there  i s  required an underlying support 
which remains throughout the  change and whioh allows the change 
to  take p lace. This i s  th e  su b s tan tia l subject of a l l  change, 
prime m atter. Also, the su b s ta n tia lly  new form towards which 
mebile being tends i s  th e  term o f generation. This lack of form 
i s  the p riva tion  w ith in  the sub jec t. Wien a new substance i s  
generated a new su b stan tia l form i s  educed from the p o te n tia l i ty  
o f m atter. This means th a t  prime m atter i s  an imperfect sub­
s ta n tia l  p o te n t ia l i ty , a capacity  fo r  receiv ing  su b s tan tia l 
forms. Prime m atter i s  a ltogether passive ,yet ia  capable of 
receiving new su b stan tia l forms. This presupposes in  the subject 
which passes to  a new substan tia l se t a oapaoity to  th is  ra th e r 
than to  another form and also supposes in  the subject a laok of 
such a su itab le  form. This p riva tion  of a new form in  a su itab le  
subject aeoounts fo r the  appearanoe o f  a new substance. The new 
substan tia l form supplants the  o ld . The corruption o f one fe rn  
i s  therefo re  the  generation o f another. The new su b stan tia l
SO A rlstotle, Physlca, 209b 23. "The form and the m atter 
are not separable £rem the th ing .*
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form i s  sa id  to  to  drama out or oduood from prime m atter by 
the a c t iv i ty  of e x is tin g  forms# i t  the sametime, the old 
su b s tan tia l form i s  reduced to  the p o te n tia l i ty  of m atte r.2*
I t  i s  the sub jec t, the prime m atter whioh undergoes 
and underlies th is  su b s tan tia l lo ss  and acquisition# fhe prime 
m atter which mas su b s ta n tia lly  co n stitu ted , fo r example, as 
wood i s  now the prime m atter th a t i s  su b s ta n tia lly  constitu ted  
by the su b s tan tia l determ inants o f smoke and ashes# Prime 
m atter, th e re fo re , i s  the substra te  whioh i s  informed, and i s  the 
subject o f su b s tan tia l changes whioh occur in  bodily  being# 
Substantial form i s  the determinant o f prime m atter as an ac tu a l 
body of d e fin ite  sp ec ific  kind# Prime matter oan lose i t s  sub­
s ta n tia l  form but not otherwise than by the incoming o f a 
d isp lacing  su b s tan tia l form# I t  i s  from th is  analysis o f 
mobile being th a t A ris to tle  concluded th a t generation requ ires  
three p rin c ip le s , these are a common sub ject, the prime matter* 
secondly, a new su b stan tia l form to  which prime m atter n a tu ra lly  
tends and th ird ly , p riv a tio n , the absence o f the new form not 
ye t acquired but whioh i s  su itab le  to  the m atter. P riva tion  i s  
only considered a p rin c ip le  o f the generation of th ings because 
In so far as the generation has not achieved the su b s tan tia l 
terra to whioh i t  i s  tending, i t  i s  said  to  lack th a t  term.
Moreover, the su b s tan tia l terra of generation i s  always
2*K# Dougherty, i b id . . pp. 118-119.
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a formed na tu re . A r is to tle  poin ts out th a t  those th ings which 
e re  constitu ted  by nature have present In  themselves a p rin c ip le  
o f motion and o f r e s t .  Natural th ings a re , In  th is  sense, 
d if fe re n t therefo re  from those th ings which are constitu ted  by 
a r t .  The l a t t e r  e x is t  w ithout any in tr in s ic  p rinc ip le  of 
change.22 However, anim als, p lan ts  and bodies are said to  
e x is t  by nature because they have w ith in  them the n a tu ra l 
p rin c ip le s  of change* A ll bodies whioh e x is t  by nature are 
oomposites of two n a tu ra l p rin c ip les! a p rinc ip le  of indetermina­
t io n  and a p rinc ip le  o f determ ination. Since the l a t t e r  i s  what 
co n stitu te s  a nature in  a c t  by determining the m atter, i t  i s  
the p rincip le  of l ife #  The doctrine o f hylomorphism holds th a t 
the l i f e  p rin c ip le  i s  the su b s tan tia l farm of the liv in g  body.
I t  i s  an ac tiv e  and determining su b s tan tia l p rin c ip le  whioh 
somehow u n ifie s  in  s tru c tu re  and function  the various hete­
rogeneous p a rts  and makes one organic substance of the whole.
The su b s tan tia l a c tu a l i ty  of th is  p rin c ip le  i s  what causes 
l i f e  in  a constitu ted  substance.
Hylomorphism, th e re fo re , holds th a t  mobile being, 
compounded of prime m atter and su b stan tia l form i s  a re a l sub­
s ta n tia l  u n ity  endowed with active  and passive powers. I t  
explains the opposite powers by the r e a l ly  d is t in c t  opposite 
p rin c ip le s , su b s tan tia l form and prime m atter. These e s se n tia l
^ A r i s to t l e ,  Physiea, 192b 22-24.
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f a r t s  o f mobile being cannot e x is t  separately* they are in* 
complete p r ia e ip le s .
Prime m atter i s  not determ inate in  i ts e l f*  i t  i s  pure 
p o te n tia l i ty  and aan e x is t  only in  the compound along w ith sub­
s ta n tia l  term. I t  i s  not brought in to  being by ohange bu t 
remains as the  sub ject of new su b stan tia l forms* The su b stan tia l 
form actualizes th e  p o te n tia l ity  o f prims m atter and i s  the 
in tr in s ic  reason why the substance i s  of one speeies and not 
another* Beoause o f i t , t h e  substance has d e fin ite  q u a lit ie s  
and d e fin ite  a c t iv i t ie s .  M atter and fern oause m aterial sub­
stance* eaeh in  th e ir  own way by c o n s titu tin g  it*  This i s  
e ffec ted  by the  action  o f an agent edueing form from m atte r .2* 
Thus, in  studying the  generation and corruption of 
mobile being the philosophy o f nature i s  concerned also w ith 
a knowledge o f the causes o f these changes.
In a ll*  A ris to tle  l i s t s  four causes24 which account 
for the coming in to  being o f  things*
In one way " th a t out of which a th ing  comes to  be 
and p e rs is ts " 25 i s  c a lled  oause. I t  i s  the  immanent m atter 
In which something comes in to  being. This oause i s  ca lled  the 
m ateria l oause beoause i t  con tribu tes to  the production of
2% . Dougherty* ib id* , p . 114.
24A ris to tle , Physioa, 194b 24 -  196a SO.
25Ibid** 194b24.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission
22
the e ffe c t by assuming new su b s tan tia l forme.
In another m y  oause i s  said to  be a p a tte rn  or 
exemplar*28 This i s  the formal oause* I t s  e ffe o t oan be 
spoken of in  two ways. F ir s t ,  i t  may be spoken of a s  an 
in tr in s ic  form in  which case i t  i s  ca lled  a speeies. The 
formal oause con tribu tes to  the production of the e ffe o t by 
communicating i t s  own determ ination in tr in s ic a l ly  to  the m atter, 
forming i t  a c tu a lly  in to  e f fe c t .  The cau sa lity  of in tr in s ic  
form i s  n e ith e r ac tio n  nor passion ,but determ ination and 
sp e c ifica tio n . By v ir tu e  of i t s  in tr in s ic  union with m atter, 
the e ffe c t i s  produced and ex ists*  Secondly, formal cause 
m y  re fe r  to  something e x tr in s ic  to  the th ing  a f te r  which a 
likeness i s  made. In th is  l a t t e r  sense an exemplar i s  said 
to  be the form of a  th ing .
In another way, th a t  "by which there  i s  a p rinc ip le  
of motion and r e s t" 27 i s  called  a oause. I t  I s  spoken of as 
the p rino ip le  from which change and r e s t  f i r s t  comes about.
For example, "the counselor i s  a cause" fo r i t  i s  because of 
h is  advice th a t  someone a c ts .  Also the fa th e r i s  the eause 
of the  son because of the nature in  the father*  So un iversa lly  
every maker is the oause of the made thing and the change, In 
the  same way, the cause of change.
26 lb id . ,  194b 26,
27I b id „  194b 29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8
With respect to  thews causes, St Thoms ooramnts,2® 
th a t  them  are four kinds o f e f f ic ie n t  sensei namely, the  
porfWotlng, 'the  preparing, the  a s s is tin g  and the  counseling, 
the  perfecting  cause i s  th a t  which completes the motion or 
change, as does th a t which introduces the substan tia l form in  
generation, the preparing or disposing cause i s  th a t  which 
adepts the  m atter or sub ject fo r  the u ltim ate  completion. The 
a s s is tin g  cause i s  th a t  which dees not operate fo r i t s  own end 
bu t fo r  the end o f another. The counseling oause, in  those 
th ings which a c t by in te n tio n , i s  th a t which gives the  agent 
the  form by means of which i t  operates.
f in a l ly ,  there  i s  the  end or purpose **fer the  sake o f 
which"*® the process i s  in i t ia te d .  In the  proeess o f generation 
the  end i s  the formed nature* Consequently i t  la  ea lled  the 
f in a l  cause because a l l  the  o ther causes are  as m ans to  the 
attainm ent o f th i s  good.
Thus in  order fo r something to  come-to-be these four
88®t Thomas Aquinas, In Octo L itre s  Fhyaloorum A rla to to lls ,
I I ,  loot*  8 , Paraae od. (Mtnr',v^i i^Aes, , l ^  X rt.ll, pp.lTO- 
271. * ,..qued  quadruples e s t  causa e f f le le n s i  s e i l l l e e t  p e rf ic le n s , 
praeparans, adjuvans e t  e e n s ll ia a s . W srfioiens enim e s t ,  quod dat 
eonplementum metal e e l m utation!, s to u t quod in tro d u e it fomam 
substantialem  in  generations. Praeparans antem sou dispenses s e t ,  
quod a p ta t materlam sou sobjeetum ad ultimum oomplementun.
M jurana vero e s t ,  qnod non operator ad proprlum flnem, sed 
ad finem a l te r iu s .  C onslllans antem in  h is  quae aguat a p repesito , 
quod dat agentl formam per quam a g it ."
*® A ristotle, Physios, I f 4Bs> 81,
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causes a re  required* f&tat comes in to  being must be o f a 
determinate nature and therefo re  must hare a  form determining 
th a t  nature* A lso, what oomes in to  being must oorae from 
something which has i t  p o te n tia lly . This i s  m atter. However 
the matter in  order to  pass from p o te n tia lly  being th e  product 
to  a c tu a lly  being i t ,  must be moved by an agent in  a e t .  This 
i s  the e f f ic ie n t  oause* And f in a l ly ,  the e f f ic ie n t  cause in  
moving the m atter to  a c tu a l i ty  must tend in  i t s  action  toward 
something determinate b e f i t t in g  i t s  own determinate na tu re . 
That to  which i t  tends i s  the f in a l  cause. So in  every pro­
duction of being these four causes are p resen t.
Such then are the p rin c ip le s  o f the philosophy of 
na tu re . They explain the n a tu ra l eoming-to-be of th ings 
through a knowledge of th e ir  p rin c ip le s  and causes*
Yet, re tu rn in g  to  our o rig in a l question, how can these 
n a tu ra l p rin c ip le s  be said  to  provide an adequate basis fo r a 
theory o f c ritic ism ?  Is  there  the p o s s ib il i ty  th a t the 
p rin c ip le s  which explain the  coming-to-be of th ings in  nature 
might a lso  explain those th ings which cone-to-be by a rt?  I f  
th i s  Is  possib le , the philosophy of nature would be q u a lified  
as the science in  which to  find  the th e o re tic a l basis o f 
critic ism #
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THE PHILOSOPHY OP ADS
Tim Hotlea of Im itation
A rt, lik e  na tu re , i s  concerned w ith the coming in to  being 
and the production of th in g s . In  the  previous chapter we have 
seen th a t the p rin c ip le s  which explain the natural process of 
generation, a re  found in  the philosophy of na tu re . However, 
since a r t  a lso  involves a process of generation i t  is  reasonable 
to  eonolude th a t  these sane p rincip les should explain the earning 
in to  being of a r t i f i c i a l  th ings. Ihere i s  no b e tte r  way In  which 
to  v e rify  th is  conclusion than to  examine, ca re fu lly , the dloturat 
"Art im ita tes  nature",*  fo r th is  formula (a t le a s t in  the  p h ilo s­
ophy th a t favours th is  conclusion) tra n s la te s  what i s  applicable 
t e  the natu ra l process of generation, in to  what is  re la tiv e  to  
the process of a r t i f i c i a l  earning in to  being .
In examining the dictum, as such, i t  is  necessary to  note 
the two profoundly d iffe ren t meanings which the term im ita tion  
acquired when i t  is  used in  the philosophical background of P la to  
Mid A r is to tle . Both agree th a t  im ita tion2 (MIMBSIS) i s  an
* A risto tle , Physloa, 194a 21,
% ef e rrin g  to  the poets in  the Laws, 7l9o, P la to  makes th e  
Athenian stranger say th a t a r t  oonsisfs I n  im itation) " . . . a r t  
being im ita t iv e , .•"« Also A ris to tle  in  the Physloa, 194a21, 
s ta te s  th a t " . . . a r t  Im itates n a tu re . . . " •
57344 
ussiiMPTiffl r a m s r r v  i m « j Y
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e sse n tia l c h a ra c te r is tic  of a l l  a rt*  However, tha fundamental 
d ifference in  th e ir  philosophical thought renders the meaning 
of im ita tion  correspondingly d ifferen t*  This w ill  he evident 
from the follow ing examination of th e ir  works.
H a te
P lato  defines a r t  by f i r s t  giving an explanation of 
i t s  o rig in . Because o f i t s  obscurity , he describes i t#  begin­
nings w ith the myth of Prometheus.® The sto ry  re la te s  how a l l  
the  animals o f the world except man were supplied by the gods 
w ith the necessary h a ir  fo r the p ro tec tion  against the  eo ld , 
w ith  the elaws to  secure food, and to  f ig h t th e ir  enemies. But 
o f a l l  the c re a tu re s , the human being was l e f t  h e lp less , incap­
able of defending or o f taking a are of h im self. Prometheus, 
th e re fo re , moved by th e  inadequacies which b e fe ll  man’s na tu re , 
s to le  f i r e  from Heaven and the a r ts  o f weaving and metal-working 
from Athena and Hephaestus.* Thus th is  P latonic myth has a r t  
coming in to  the world in  order to  meet the needs of man in  h is  
f ig h t fo r ex is tence . Through the  exercise  of th is  g i f t  of a r t ,  
man "was not long in  inventing a r t ic u la te  speech and namesj and 
he also constructed houses and e lo th s  and shoes and beds} and
®Plato, Protagoras,  32Qd-322.
*Athema was the Greek goddess of wisdom and Hephaestus 
the  god of f i r e  and master o f the forge*
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draw sustenanoe from the e a r th . . • and th e ir  a r t  was only 
su ff ic ie n t to  provide them w ith the means of life ."®  Here 
P la te  puts forward one aspect o f h is  conception of a r t .  This i s  
the  exercise  of human s k i l l  fo r the  fu lf illm e n t of man's needs.
P lato  presents a fu r th e r  aspeot o f a r t  in  the S ta tes-
man.® In the  a r t  ©f carpentering as in  a l l  the  s k i l l s ,  the
knowledge of the workman i s  merged in  h is  work. The master of 
any a r t  i s  the one who knows host the function of h is  products. 
But, over the  manual a r t s ,  there i s  the sphere of pure knowledge 
which professes the supreme a r t  in  which one lea rn s to  weigh 
and count a l l  human functions "with what i s  f i t t i n g ,  having 
regard fo r  the idea l standard ."7 Since the philosopher alone 
i s  able to  grasp the e te rn a l and unchangeable tru th  Plato con­
cludes th a t the "loyal Art* i s  th a t  of,phll©s©pher-king.
In order to  determine whether poetry i s  a rea l a r t  or
no t, P late  examines i t  in  the l ig h t  o f the "Royal Art" of
philosophy. The philosopher, whose views m a t  always be ra t io n a l ,  
finds the poets wanting in  understanding. P lato  p e rs is ts  th a t  
poets compose on subjects they do not understand. In the Apology, 
Soerates re la te s  how he questioned a group o f poets on how well 
they understood their own words. " I  presently recognised.. .th a t
8P la to , Protogoras, 820e -  822.
® P la to , Statesman, 268o -  269b.
7Ib id .,  286b.
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what they composed was not by wiadorn but by nature,and banana* 
they wore insp ired  lik e  the  prophets and g ivers o f o rao lesi fo r 
those also say »aay fin# th ings but know none of the th ings they 
say,*®
Also in  the  Ion, P lato  again judges on the o ffice  of the
myth-maker. In th e i r  work, the poet* are insp ired  by the  gods,
ra th e r than guided by the knowledge or a r t  o f  what they do.
"fo r a l l  good poets , epic as w ell as ly r ie ,  eompose 
th e ir  b e au tifu l poems not by a r t ,  bu t because they 
are insp ired  and possessed ...Seeing  then th a t i t  is  
not by a r t  th a t  they  eompose and u t te r  so many fine  
things about the deeds of m an...but by divine power 
. . . f o r  not by a r t  does the poet s in g , but by power 
divine.*®
When the  poet i s  oomposing he i s  not in  h is  senses. He is  the 
v io tin  of the  uprush of In sp ira tio n  which deprives him of h is  
ra tio n a l fa c u lty  and therefo re  o f a r t .  "Iter a l l  good p o e ts .•• 
compose th e ir  b eau tifu l poems not by a r t  bu t because they are 
insp ired  and possessed."*® Shis non-rational in sp ira tio n  
denies the  poet the name of a r t i s t  because a r t  admits only of 
the t ru th  whereas the poet, " is  often compelled to  represent 
men of opposite d isp o s itio n s , and thus to  eon trad ie t him selfj 
n e ith e r can he t e l l  whether there  i s  mere tru th  in  one th ing
®Plato, Apology, 22o.
®Flato, Ion, 838e -  634a. 
l Olbld.
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1 1th a t ho has said than in  ano ther."  I t  la  only with the truo  a rt*  
lo ts  the philosopher-king th a t there  la  present the e o ie n tif ie  
t ru th  which i s  necessary fo r a r t .
I t  i s  at the beginning of Book 1 of the Bepublie th a t
P la to  employs the te rn  im ita tion  to  denote the re la tio n  in
whioh poetry stands to  the tru th  of d ivine ideas* 12 Be proceeds
to  show th a t what both the  dramatis and the epic forms give are 
represen ta tions of appearances* and not the tru th  of the immut­
able ideas* I llu s io n  instead  of rea lity *  This poetry* he 
sta tes*  resembles painting in  th a t both im itate  things of the 
v is ib le  world* the  one in  words* the other in  oolour* as they 
appear to  be* from th is  or th a t point of view .I3 What the  poet 
and the p a in te r  present are  therefo re  not actual th ings -  as 
th ings produced by the craftsman are ac tu a l -  but merely eepies 
or tra n sc r ip ts  of those things* In th a t  sense* both a r t i s t s  
obviously f a l l  short of r e a l i ty .  But even the work of the  c ra f ts ­
man i s  shown to  be none other than a copy* a defective copy of 
the o rig in a l "idea* e x is tin g  in  the mind of Gods so th a t he too 
f a i l s  to  apprehend and reproduce r e a l i ty .  At the same time* the 
craftsman i s  said to  stand nearer to  the t ru th  of th ings, fo r
Uplate* Laws* 7 1 9 b ,
Republic* 595* " . . . a l l  poe tlea l im itations a re
ruinous to  the understanding of the hearers* and th a t the  
knowledge of th e ir  tru e  nature is  the only antido te  to  them.*
l 8Ib id *, 596. "And the p a in te r too is* * .ju s t suoh 
another - ’a~creator of appearances**
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he hat some knowledge (" r ig h t opinion") o f the th ings ho makes, 
whereas tho post,w ith  h is  imperfect copy, stands two removed 
from the t r u th ,  and a l l  ho a tta in s  to  i s  store con jectu re . In 
sh o rt, P la to 's  oharge against poets on th is  i s  th a t  they produce 
only unsubstan tia l images sueh as a man might make by holding 
up a m irror to  tho th ings o f the sensib le  w orld.*4 Tho poet, 
th e re fo re , in  h is  im ita tions p resen ts the ex ternal and the  super­
f ic i a l  fo r  the  whole, and the  unreal appearances fo r the  t ru th  
o f th in g s . For P la to , the poets indulged in  se rv ile  copying 
and in  reproducing p a r t ia l  images of the t ru th .
I t  i s  on the theory th a t  the re a l world is  the world 
o f Ideas, th a t  P lato judges the place o f v is ib le  th ings and of 
poetry . All v is ib le  th ings are im ita tions or p a rtic ip a tio n s  
of the supersensible archetypes whose pa tterns have been follow­
ed by the Demiurge in  fashioning the un iverse. Human a r tis a n s , 
in  tu rn , make beds and e the r a r t i f a c ts  s t i l l  fu rth e r removed 
irtm  the tru e  models. But the poet i s  an im ita to r o f Im itations 
and i s  henee " th rie e  removed from the king and from the t r u th ."15 
le  i s  not a genuine maker bu t a c lever manipulator o f appearances, 
from H a te 's  exposition on im ita tion  in  Book 1 o f the
Republic it is olear that for any class of objects there Is
only one "idea* and th a t  i s  un iversal and t r u e .  Sow i t  i s  the
**Ibld„  694d.
16P la to , Republic, 60Sb,
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wisdom of tho phllosopher-king ©r tho "Royal A rtis t"  to  under­
stand and contemplate tho un iversal and tho true* A rtisans, on 
the other hand, deal w ith the th ings of the v is ib le  world* They 
make oouohes, c h a irs , ships and ©eats* In the th ird  removed, how­
ever, poets and pa in ters  make images which are im itations of the 
v is ib le  world* Tho number of images th a t can be made is  not lim­
ite d , and they are not bound to  any oonsisten t lo g ica l tru th*  To 
P la te , i t  was a p la in  and obvious fa c t th a t the a r t i s t  did a c t pro­
duce the objects of the v is ib le  world, but only th e ir  appearances* 
Because such im itations do not a t t a in  to  the tru th  of th in g s , P lato  
condemns them as "ruinsous to  th e  understanding*
However, a carefu l reading of the  Dialogues d iscloses 
th a t fo r Plat© there  are  im itations and im itations* There are  
the im itations of the poets and the  pa in te rs of h is day which 
he condemns in  the Republic**7 But there  are also  the im itations 
of the good a r t i s t s  and poets who concern themselves w ith t ru th  
and which he commends In  the law s.18 The righ tness of an
16Ib id . ,  595b*
170n th is  p o in t, I t  has been suggest d by K* E. G ilbert and 
Helmut Kuhn in  th e ir  work, A H istory of E sthetics (Hew York* Mac­
M illan, 1939), p . 29, th a t  * H a t©“'SoulMoss'"'tiad '"in mind as a p a r t ic ­
u la r instance of bad im ita tive  a r t  the new school of l l lu s io n is t lo  
painting coming In to  favor in  h is  tim e, p rac tised  by Appollodorus, 
Zeuxis, and Parrhasius in  which perspective and v a ria tio n s in  tone 
were used to  give the complete semblance of the outer world*"
P la to , jaws.,  668* "*.*we must a s se r t  that im ita tio n s»*•
are to  be judged of by the standard of tru th ,  and by no other 
whatever*"
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im ita tion  l i e s  in  tho reproduction of tho q u a lity  and pro* 
portions o f tho o rig ina l fo r  "the tru th  of im itation  consists  
. . . i n  rendering the th ing  im itated  according to  quantity  and 
q u a l i t y A p p l y i n g  the  ease to  a s ta tu e , there  must bo 
present the  proportions of a body, and the  true  s itu a tio n  of 
the  p a rts  which i s  only obtained from a knowledge of the 
animal Im itated . In other words, P lato  i s  in s is tin g  th a t  for 
an im ita tio n , knowledge o f the  th ing  Im itated i s  requ ired , 
otherw ise, i t  beeemeo a m irroring o f  th ings in th e ir  ephemeral 
s ta te  of becoming.
Mr J .l .A tk in s  remarks on th is  tru e  notion of im ita tion
as held by Plato and which stands in  c o n tra s t to  th e  kind of
im ita tion  spoken o f In the Republic. Re w rite s , re fe rr in g
f i r s t  to  the  deceptive im itations*
"Of these eonaeptlens, . • .P la to  makes frequent use 
m aintaining th a t  poets indulged in  se rv ile  copying 
and in  reproducing p a r t ia l  images of the  tru th .
Yet,*1 he continues, “Plato also  advances beyond th is  
position} and indeed th is  i s  the p o sitio n  he t r i e s  
everywhere to  re fu te , a fa c t  which i s  not always fu lly  
re a lis e d . Alive as he was to  an unseen re a l i ty  e x is t­
ing behind the objects of sense, he conceived of an 
im ita tion  of th e  idea l forms o f  th a t unseen world, 
ideas o f  ju s t ic e ,  beauty and truth*..A nd i t  i s  th is  
kind o f 'im ita tio n 1 th a t  he assoc ia tes w ith  poetry 
in  i t s  h ighest form} but a process whioh represen ts 
th ings as they ought to be and not in  th e i r  a c tu a l i ty ."20
Mr Atkins re a l is e s  and expresses in  these words the twofold
19J M d ., 668b.
Atkins, L ite ra ry  C ritic ism  in  Antiquity (London* 
Methuen, 1982), I ,  p." 1|2 .
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meaning of im ita tion  as i t  appears in  F la to #s works. Shore are 
tho deceptive im ita tions o f th e  poets and p a in te rs  who are l e s t  
in  the in f in i te  m irroring o f appearanoes w ithout ever r is in g  to  
a knowledge o f  the world of ideas* (hi the other hand, there  are 
the tru e  im ita tions o f the good poets and a r t i s t s  who understand 
what they are im ita tin g , they  transcend th e  v is ib le  world, as 
suoh, and through an understanding o f t ru th  of the ideal forms 
express tru e  im ita tio n s , t ru th  la  la id  down by Plato as a kind 
o f  minimum requirement fo r a good im ita tio n , th is  need fo r  a 
"transcendental l ia iso n "8* with t ru th  i s  s tressed  by P late  as 
e sse n tia l to  good im ita tio n . I f  i t  i s  lacking the im itations 
Immediately f a l l  baOk to  the leve l o f  deoeption and su p e rf ic ia l 
copies,w ithout any concern fo r the  supersensible i n t e l l i g ib i l i ty  
o f the world o f id eas. Ftor P la to , im ita tion  in  th is  transcen­
dental aspect, i s  c h ie fly  a m atter of in te l l ig ib le  rep resen ta tion  
o f t ru th .  But on th is  b a s is ,  as we have seen, the  philosopher 
and not the  poet i s  the  tru e  "Royal A rtis t"  because i t  i s  h is  
proper task to  seek the t r u th .88 Yet th is  transcendental t ru th  
charac te rises the whole of Platons philosophy and i t  is  essen­
t i a l  fo r a l l  tru e  a r t ,  whether o f the phllo  sopher-king, of the 
poet or of the artist.
8* fh is  term  is  used by Rissa M arltain  in  S itua tion  Do La 
Poesia (Paris* D esells, 1938), p . 17, to  charac te rize  the 
necessary connection which a r t  must have with the world of the 
s p i r i t  and of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y .
22P la to , Republic, 480b.
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P la to 's  In a b ility  to  acknowledge tho m aterial • lament 
In  a r t  l i  due to  the  lim ita tio n s  which h is  theory of ideas 
forces upon him* S ta rtin g  from the notion  of pure being he 
found r e a l i ty  only in  the world e f  Ideas* Since the becoming 
o f the sensib le  world was the  simple a n tith e s is  o f  being, he 
was compelled to  regard the  r i s i b le  changing world as th a t  
mhieh i s  wot* A philosophy e f  nature was th e re fo re  a lien  to  
h is  thought because the  sensible world was only an i l lu s io n . 
Knowledge, in  the F latonle system, i s  lim ited  to  the world of 
ideas* All e lse  i s  th e  ob jec t of opinion* The view th a t  r e a l i ty  
i s  s in g le , undivided and unchangeable amounts, th e re fo re , to  
the  ab o litio n  of na tu ra l philosophy* This laok e f  a philosophy 
e f  nature in  th e  Platonic thought, mores V Mari ta in  to  w rite  t 
"When the philosopher t r i e s  desp ite  everything to  give an 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  world and to  r is e  abowo common opinion, he 
can proeeed only w ith th e  help of myths* The use of myths to  
In te rp re t sensib le  nature i s  r e a l ly  indispensable In  P la to 's  
philosophy."28 Since P lato has no philosophy o f nature he i s  
unable to  ju s t i f y  tho r e a l i ty  o f e i th e r  sensib le  nature or o f the 
sensib le  m anifestations o f a rt*
However, desp ite  h is  exaggerated essen tia lism , P la te  
had pointed o u t, a t le a s t  negative ly , th a t  a philosophy of a r t  
requ ires a transcendent aspect* This i s  the element which
g*dao<paes M arltain , La Philosophic Bo La Nature, So ed . 
(Paris* Tegui, 1936), p /T Z
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ra ise s  a r t  above the  senses to  the  level of contemplation and 
which free s  I t  from the tyranny of sensib le  im ita tio n s . True 
im ita tio n s , fo r P la to , must as a minimum requirement, involve 
the in te l l ig ib le  w orld. Although i t  was P la to ’s e rro r to  have 
posited th is  in te l l ig ib le  world outside o f th in g s , s t i l l  th is  
in  no way d is tra c ts  from h is  negative in tu it io n  in to  the need for 
a transcendent element in  a r t .  True im ita tion  In P la te 's  sense 
would im ita te  th ings not as they appear to  b e , but as they are 
in  the transcendent world o f archetypes. These immutable, 
e te rn a l natures were the only ob jec ts o f tru e  im ita tio n s.
A ris to tle
As was pointed out a t  the beginning of th is  chapter, 
the dictum "Art im ita tes nature* furn ishes a point reference 
on which the coming*to-be o f a r t  can be compared with the  coming- 
to-be o f na tu re . The term "nature" i s  taken here in  i t s  s t r i e t  
sense as was defined in  the Physloa of A r is to tle . I t  i s  an 
inner p rin c ip le  o f a c t iv i ty  or the source of ontological s t r iv ­
ing in  th ings which re a liz e s  the  perfections o f  the beings so 
e n d o w e d . A r i s t o t l e  id e n tif ie s  nature as power of movement, 
with nature as form. The form or mode o f  s tru c tu re  o f a thing 
i s  Ju s t th a t  by v ir tu e  o f which i t  moves, grows and comes to  
r e s t  when i t  has reached the terminus o f  i t s  movement. And
2 *A riste tle , Phyaiea, 194a 28-29.
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oenversely the  power to  move, grow and a l t e r  in  a c e r ta in  
d e fin ite  way i s  ju s t  the for® or character o f each th in g .28
for A r is to tle , nature a ad a r t  are the  two main source* 
of th* coming-to-be o f thing*.'®6 they d if fe r  in  th a t nature 
has i t*  p rin c ip le  o f motion w ith in  i t s e l f ,  while "from a r t  
proceed the  th in g s o f which the for® is  in  the soul of the  
a r t i s t .* 27 As nature i s  p rim arily  a v i t a l  process working it*  
way out through natu ra l products, th e  developing and producing 
of thing* according to  determining form*; so a r t  is  fo r  him a 
making, a movement s e t  up in  some medium by the  soul and hand 
o f th e  a r t i s t . 28 In so f a r  as a r t  is  a process of making, i t  
im ita tes th e  v i ta l  processes in  the world of nature* the point 
of comparison which A ris to tle  makes i s  th a t  a lik e  in  those thing* 
which come-to-be by nature and by a r t ,  th e re  i*  present in  each 
©no an union of m atter and form. A ris to tle  affirm s th a t  
" . . . a l l  th ings produced e ith e r  by nature or by a r t  have matter} 
fo r each o f  them is  capable of being and o f  not being, and th is  
capacity  3a the m atter in e a c h . . .”28 The natu ra l development
28A ris to tle , Metaphysics, 1026a.
28A ri» to tle , Metaphysics, 1032a 12.
27Ib id .,  1032a 31.
28Ib id .,  1032a 26. * . , , a l l  o ther productions are ca lled
•makings*. And a l l  asking proceed e ith e r  from a r t  or from a 
facu lty  or from thought.”
29Ib ld . ,  1032a 20-22.
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of form out o f  m atter, in  tho process o f coming-to-be, la  what 
a r t  im ita tes In  I t s  own proooss o f generation. As the things 
e f  nature develop from w ith in  unfolding and expanding according 
to  th e ir  own p rin c ip le  o f motion, so in  a r t i f io i a l  generation 
a r t  Im itates the dynamic process o f nature which proceeds 
towards d e fin ite  ends by determined means* A ris to tle ’s concep­
tio n  of * Im itation’* as applied to  the  im ita tive  a r ts  i s  sa id  to  
emulate the  coming*to-be ©f th ings in  nature because a bronze 
bowl issues from the metal on the same e s se n tia l  plan as the 
p lan t grows from i t s  seed.
Unlike P la to ’s Promethean myth on the o rig in  o f a r t ,  
A ris to tle  places poetry among those goods which are the natu ra l 
f r u i ts  o f the  human reason.®® For A ris to tle  i t  i s  na tu ra l fo r 
man to  make th in g s . I t  i s  in  th is  na tu ra l tendency fo r  man to 
im ita te  th a t  A ris to tle  finds one oause o f poetry . Indeed man. 
“ is  the most im itative  oreature in  the world, and lea rn s f i r s t  
by im itation."®* From experience and common testim ony we knew 
th a t man. takes pleasure in  im ita ting  and in  viewing representa­
t io n s . "To be learn ing  something i s  the g rea tes t o f  pleasures 
not only of the philosopher but a lso  to  the r e s t  of mankind 
however small their capacity for it* the  reason for the
®®Aristotle, Mataphyslea, 980b 25. "The animals other 
than man l iv e  by appearances and memories, and have but l i t t l e  
o f  connected experiencej but the human raee l iv e s  also by a r t  
and reasoning#*’’
Sl A ris to tle , Footle a, 1448b 7-8.
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d eligh t la  seeing, i s  th a t  one i s  a t  the sometime learning -  
gathering the  meaning o f  th in g s•"83
I t  i s  necessary to  note th a t  when he s ta te s  th a t  "Art 
Im itates nature* and, again th a t  "the objects o f im ita tion  are 
men in ac tio n ,* 83 A ris to tle  i s  re fe rr in g  f i r s t  to  the process 
o f  generation in a r t  and secondly, to  the ob jec t o f the im ita­
t iv e  a r t s .  ?he poet, according to  A ris to tle , in  the engender­
ing of a work of a r t ,  Im itates the c rea tiv e  processes of 
nature* but h is  subject-m atter i s  man.and the objects of 
poetic im ita tio n , human l i f e  in  a l l  i t s  m anifesta tion# .8^ As 
applied to  poetry , im ita tion  has a th reefo ld  object*
"character, emotions and actions#"8®
/
"By ETEE are meant the  c h a ra c te r is tic  moral qua li- 
tiesTtKe permanent d ispositions e f  the  mind which 
reveal a ce rta in  condition of the w ill*  PAfHB are 
the more tra n s ie n t emotions, the  passing moods o f  
feelings HA3BBI3 are actions in  th e ir  proper and 
inward seneeT In  a c t viewed merely as an external 
process or r e s u l t ,  one o f a se rie s  of outward 
phenomena, i s  n e t th e  tru e  ob jec t e f  a r t i s t i c  
im itation* She FRA3EI3 which a r t  seeks to  reproduce 
Is  mainly an inward process, a physical energy work­
ing outwardj deeds, in c id en ts , even ts, s itu a tio n s  
being included under i t  so fa r  as these spring from 
an inward ac t of w i l l ,  or e l i c i t  some a c t iv i ty  of 
thought and feeling#"8®
*2Ib id .,  1448b 12-17.
88Ib id . , 1448a 1.
84Vlde jr. « . Atkins, Ib id . ,  p . 81. 
g® A ristotle, P oe tics, 1448a £8.
8«S. Butcher, A r is to tle 's  Theory o f poetry  and Fine Art, 
4th ed. (London* if io J im in ; lW J7 p T T 2 'S ;  --------------------
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Actions in  tho sense defined ore fo r A ris to tle  the 
proper subject o f im itations.® 7 The a r ts  im itate  actions in  
th e ir  m an ifesta tions, and only the m ateria l o b je c ts ,in  so fa r  
as these serve to  in te rp re t the s p ir i tu a l  and mental processes. 
This i s  apparent in  the very d e fin itio n  of tragedy. Tragedy 
i s  * an im ita tion  o f an action  th a t  i s  serious and also* as 
haring magnitude, complete in i t s e l f .* 88 Sines i t  i s  an 
im itative  art*  tragedy i s  an attem pt to  aot fo rth  in  concrete 
terms* but under con tro llab le  and In te l l ig ib le  oireumatanoes* 
the un iversal and formal aspect o f human l i f e .
Sinee beauty demands th a t  tragedy be complete and e f 
a c e r ta in  magnitude* there  must be a proper d is tr ib u tio n  o f 
p a rts . The completeness o f a good tragedy l i e s  in  th is*  th a t  
i t  c o n s titu te s  a whole in  which beginning* middle and end of 
the ac tion  mutually im plicate one another. Thus i t  se ises
upon "what ought to  b e ,”®® the b e tte r  thing* laying bore only
the necessary sequence of events. Every b eau tifu l worlt of a r t  
must be a c e rta in  appropriate sise* both to  remain tru e  to  i t s  
form and to  provide su itab le  eondltlons fo r p leasurable eon* 
tem platlon. Beauty in  a r t  i s  "therefo re  impossible e ith e r  in  
•i very minute oreuture, since our preemption becomes indistinct
87A risto tle*  Poetioa* 1448a 1 . "The ob jec ts the im ita to r 
represents are ac tions* ..*
Ib id .,  1449b 24-26.
89Ib ld .* 1460b 10.
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as it approaches| or in  a creatu re  o f vast slue -  one, say a 
thousand m iles long -  as in  th a t case , instead  of the object 
being seen a l l  a t  once, the u n ity  and wholeness is  lo s t  to  
the beholder."40
In designating p lo t the  most important element in  
tragedy, A ris to tle  was remaining ti*ue to  h is  philosophical 
eonrle tiona concerning the primacy of fe rn  over m atter, of 
ae t over potency* For character and thought are in potency 
to  th e ir  a c tu a liza tio n  in  the action o f the  p le t .  Thus p lo t 
i s  "the l i f e  and sou l, so to  speak of tragedy ,"4* sines I t  is  
the formal o r actual p rinc ip le  In m anifest operation . The 
im ita tion  must be o f one action j the un iversal must be focussed 
in  a d e fin ite  ac tion . Just as nature h e rse lf  i s  not merely 
ep isodic4® so a lso , " in  poetry the sto ry  as an im ita tion  of 
ac tio n , must rep resen t one a e tle n , a complete whole, w ith i t s  
several incidents so c lo se ly  connected th a t  the transposal or 
withdrawal e f  any o f them w ill d is jo in  and d is lo ca te  the 
whole*4®
While in  the  natu ra l order the attainm ent of the end
40Ib id . ,  1450b 88-1451a S.
**Ib id . ,  1480a 57-28.
d2 A ris to tle , Metaphysioa, 1090b 20. "But the observed fa c ts  
show th a t nature i s  non a se rie s  o f episodes, lik e  bad tragedy."
^ A r is to t le ,  B eetles, 1451a 51-54.
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holds tho place o f tho b e a u tifu l ,44 a r t  completes and tran s­
cends nature by rea liz in g  ends beyond i t s  ordinary capacity .
Form is  th# p rin c ip le  of u n ity , a manifold v a rie ty  in  u n ity , 
an organic whole* The ideal p lo t w ist be constructed in  an 
o rderly  and symmetrical fash ion , "so as to  enable the work to  
produce i t s  own proper p leasure with a l l  th e  u n ity  o f  a liv in g  
c rea tu re .* 45 In the  P o lit le a  i t  i s  noted th a t "beauty i s  
rea liz ed  in  number and magnitude, and the s ta te  whioh oombines 
magnitude with good ordor must n ecessa rily  be the most beauti­
fu l ."d® Thus beauty in a r t  was scarcely d istingu ished  from 
the s ta te  o f well-rounded perfection  in  which a r t i s t i c  form 
had been successfu lly  determined in  i t s  proper medium or 
m atter.
In h is well-known comparison of poetry and h is to ry , 
A ris to tle  awards the  palm to  th© former on the grounds th a t i t  
t r e a ts  of the un iversal aspect of th in g s , whereas h is to ry  
contents I t s e l f  w ith p a rtic u la r  f a c t s .47 for "the p o e t's  
function i s  to  describe , not the th ing  th a t has happened,
^ A r i s to t l e ,  Do Partibus Aalmallum, 645a 24-26. "Absence 
of haphazard and conduo'ivness oi1 everything to  an end are to  be 
found in  N ature 's works in  the  highest degree, and the re su lta n t 
end o f her generations and combinations i s  a form of the  
b e a u tifu l .”
^ A r is to t le ,  P oe tise , 1459a 20-21.
^ A r is to t le ,  P o l i t ic s , 1526a 55-55.
47A risto tle#  Poetioa, 1461b 5-7.
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but u kind of th in g  th a t might happen, what i s  possib le  as 
being probable or necessary***® A un iversal statem ent is  
about what a men w ill  probably or necessa rily  do* The poet* 
represen ts th ings "as they were and a re , or as they are said 
or thought to  be or to  haw been or as they ought to  b e .”49 
In any ease , what i s  fixed  upon in  im ita tion  and expressed in  
a oonerete way i s  th e  u n iw rs a l ,  the p rin c ip le  of a c tu a lity  
which o rig in a tes  from the mind of the maker,80
While "h is to ry  has to  d e a l, not w ith one action  but 
with a period and a l l  th a t  happened in  th a t to  one or more 
persons however disconnected the several events may haw 
been,"81 a r t  mast obserw  a s t r i c t e r  economy, adhering 
r ig id ly  to  the ru le  of form* I f  the  a r t i s t  i s  accused o f 
adhering to  th ings as they a re , he may well r e to r t ,  " th a t the 
object wight to  be as described -  an answer lik e  th a t  of 
Sophocles, who said  th a t  he drew men as they ought to  be, and 
Euripides as they were*"82 For th e  a r t i s t  is  anxious to  
so hie w ,  i f  only in  im ita tio n , th a t transcendent goal towards 
which a l l  nature i s  striv ing*  the requirements of poetry or
48Ib id *, 1461a 37-59.
48Ib id*, 1460b 10-11.
80A ris to tle , Metaphysics, 10S2a 32-61.
81A ris to tle , Fcetloa , 1439a 21-24*
82Ib id .,  1460b 33-36.
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uof wmam tradition ©r th© aftega&alo* of « fullar roaltty quit# 
rofuta* tho ©b;J®eia of ©lavishly lAb©I*ttl IttltAtOra* Should KWNCtf 
for imatano#* find fault with m p>ltear baoaus® ho portray# a  
hite with herns, th#y mm «nly juatifiod If  steh a teehaieai 
testate tea mm. tatiaate oommetten with th® total 
of tte  work of art# Aristotl# will m% tolorab# a rt white la a 
alarlati rogroduetdon of facta#
I t  la  on #1 0  guiding p rln e ip ls s  Of tho philosophy o f 
natw « th at A ris to tle  e rec t#  h la  tteo ry  o f  Im itation  ia  a r t#  T© 
Mat teaaastac meant not an appear lag  a te  a vanishing away o f  
•daoaptiwa teate*#*# 5tw* $tett#*s o f ©hanging thing# ©want a  
proaoso o f  d iro lo fw n t#  an unfolding o f te a t  ia  a lready In aot 
tad  la  potsaoy to  fu rtho r aet* lha oooerata indiv idual th ing  
la  not a  # t e » y  Ap^sm m m  hut te a  p ite s ry  ro a llty #  ffeara 
a r is ta  in  w ste th in g an to ta iiig ib i®  a te  immaterial ©iasaant 
w hite i r l a t t e l a  © all# im m * te  v irtu #  o f  t e i t e  I t  poam em a a  
apaeifi©  aatura# This pr ino lp la  ia  mot ao p ra te  ikon th ings hut 
i t  inharas ia  item  a# oat o f  te a  faetor©  which oonatitu tao  th o lr  
subol&na*# th m  i te lv ld m i  though su tah la  a te  e o m a y
t ib ia ,  ar«  a© t«»@sr *dao®pblv® ahteow#** they ar«  re a lity *  
A riab o tls’a te o la  philosophy la  eantarad upon te a l  sx istsnoa , 
tea raa s  PMb®*# to te #  t©wards id ea l esasnoaa# L ite P la to  te a  
tejaab  o f th# in to llo o t  la  tea  aam nm a o f thing# but teaaa 
m m n m a mm j »  thing# a te  no t ©utaida o f than# fh© osaonoo 
tewaaalty* a# a  univaraal o x ls ta  only 3m tea  in te l le c t  -  in
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our mind, which ex trac ts  or ab strac ts  i t  froa  the things in  
which i t  e x is ts  ind iv idualized , th a t  i s ,  the  essence of P e te r, 
Paul and John is  humanity, or humus nature and th a t i t  is  only 
as an object of th e  in te llig en c e  th a t i t  e x is ts  n ecessa rily .
The essences of sensib le  things therefo re  possess no separate 
existence in  a  pure s ta te j  fo r A ris to tle  the  whole Platonio 
world of archetypal ideas has no J u s tif ic a tio n  whatever.
A rt, th e re fo re , is  no longer twice removed from the 
t ru th  of things} i t  is  the  m anifestation of a higher t ru th ,  
the  expression of the un iversal which i s  not outside of and 
ap art froa  the  p a r t ic u la r , but presupposed in  eaoh p a r t ic u la r ,
A work of a r t  is  an image of r e a l i ty  which is  generated in  the  
form and through which the form shows more apparent than in  the 
ac tual w orld.
Consequently, "im itation" fo r A ris to tle  meant "im ita ting  
th ings as they  ought to  be,*®® There i s  no question of a bare 
im ita tio n , o f a l i t e r a l  tra n sc r ip t of the world of r e a l i ty ,
Th© a r t i s t  aims a t  something b e t te r  than th e  ao tu a l. He 
produces a near th in g , not tho ac tual th ing  of appearance, not 
a copy of r e a l i ty ,  but a higher r e a l i ty  -  "for the a r t i s t  ought 
to Improve on his model*C#4 There is a form whioh Is present 
in  each indiv idual phenomena but im perfectly manifested because
®*Ib ld„  1460b 6 ,
M lb ld „  1461b 11,
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tho general movement of organic l i f e  i s  in  potenoy to  i t s  perfec­
t io n . Forms imprest themselves on the sdnd of the a r t i s t  through 
the  instrument of tho senses* and he seeks to  give them more 
complete expression* to  bring  to  l ig h t the id ea l which i s  only 
h a lf  revealed in  the  world of rea lity *
"Beneath the individual* the  tra n s ie n t and the p a rtic u la r  
the  'im ita tiv e  a r t 1 finds the un iv ersa l. I t  passes beyond the  
bare r e a l i ty  given by nature* and expresses a pu rified  form of 
r e a l i ty  disengaged from accident* and freed from the conditions 
which thwart i t s  development. The rea l and the idea l from th is  
poin t of view are not opposites* as they are  sometimes conceived 
to  be. The id ea l is  the  real* but r id  of contradictions* unfolding 
i t s e l f  according to  the laws of i t s  own being* apart from the a lie n  
influences and the disturbances of chance."85
Here then* in  general* is  A r is to t le 's  view of a r t  as i t  I s  
re la ted  to  the  notion "Art im ita tes n a tu re ."
Bo the  philosophers or theologians who come a f te r  A r is te tle  
add anything to  h is thought! Or do they depart from i t  and se ise  
upon some other p rin c ip le  of explanation. These are the fuestions 
which the next chapter w il l  answer*
55S. Butcher, ib id .*  pp. 160-iSl*
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She Hotion o f Im itation  in  C hristian  fhought
With the  ocaalng ©f C h ris tia n ity , Sod a s  the Creator of 
a l l  th ings ©as the cen tra l notion in  theo log ica l and philosoph­
ic a l  thought. la tu re  m s  the name fo r a l l  th a t  m s  created by 
Sod, and since i t  m s  created  by Him, i t  m s  re jo iced  in , a s  
His Art* In i t s  beauty and notions were men the Divine I n t e l l i ­
gence causing the seasons in  th e ir  cycles and l i f e  in  i t s  actions* 
Ih ia  e x a lta tio n  of nature as the Divine A rt grew to  a g rea t in ­
te n s ity  in  the w ritin g s o f the Church Fathers* In arguing th a t  
sensible th ings cure m ans of ra is in g  our minds to  a  contemplation 
of th e ir  Divine C reator, St Gregory of Hyssa exclaims*
“For idien we have concluded generally  th a t  no single 
th ing  ex is tin g , whether an ob jec t of sense or of thought, 
i s  formed spontaneously or fo r tu ito u s ly , but th a t  every­
th ing  discoverable in  the  world i s  linked to  the Being,
Who transcends a l l  existence and possesses the source 
of i t s  continuance, and wo then perceive th a t  beauty 
and the  majesty of the  wonderful s ig h ts  of c rea tio n , we 
thus get tram, these and such-like marks a new range o f 
thought about D eity, and in te rp re t each one o f the 
thoughts thus a r is in g  w ith in  us by a  specia l name, 
follow ing the advice of Wisdom Who says th a t  *by the 
greatness and beauty of the c rea tu res p roportionately  
the Maker o f them i s  seen***1
St Gregory of Hyssa, M eins and Post-Hioine Fathers o f the 
C hristian  Chur eh, tran s* , S iilip" ’"iohaW' aS'''Wenry la c e , ' second" 
se r ie s  “(lew Yorks C h ris tian  L ite ra tu re , 1893), Y, p* 309*
48
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m  <Bary»oste» apea&s of nature as God*» creation w ith the
same glorification*
"Loolc*® exhorts to» s a in t ,  % t the  s ta rry  heavens, 
the groat p la in s  where tits s tag  and doe f re e ly  
browse about the  fountain*, and t a i l  m  sfeetear 
« •  should 1m enraptured %  the beau ties ©f nature 
and by the amrvelous -aortal o f the  Creator**2
3Ma awareness o f Bivte© Creation ted to© o ffse t  of drawing
nan to  mater©* Siaoe the wonder and delight ©xparienoad i s
nature was a ttr ib u te d  to  tee  B irina A rt, tear#  gradually
arose a  o e rte to  a w o s t W l  a t t i tu d e  toward aensibla re a lity *
te tu ro  in  i t «  various form* displayed to© to t e l l i  g ib i l l ty ,
the  beauty* tba  order -ami. to© gm a$»w  wfedsih a ra  themselves
th a  ia p r in t  o f tha B irina Hater and ©Mob refreshed  tit© .s ite
and body ®f w o  in  h is  everyday oxietemee* C hrist Himself in
B is teachings suasaoaed nan to  am appreciation o f th© beauty o f
the  112 i»s o f  tha  f i e ld ,  i d i k  were more b eau tifu l than
Solomon in  a l l  M s  glory*
fo r  the m ti  o f C h ris t, found toemtelvws consider leg a l l  a r t  
which was s o t  Sod* a a s  something ^ a r t i f ic ia l* ,  end, therefor©, 
to  be discouraged* they se re  so absorbed to  the  beauty of the
Divine Art* everywhere exem plified to  nature* th a t  they n eg lec t­
ed the ro le  which to e  hisses a r t i s t  te e  . t o  perpetuating* to  a 
secondary Mate* God’ s Creation to  toe  sensib le  world* Ib is
C hristian  w riters*  to  th e ir  sim p lic ity  m& se a l
% ide Usuries do Ifulf, t o t  and 
iS f tg ©  U dell, 0#F* (toxufaaTJI©
tr&ns*, S is te r  
>50), p* 128*
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i s  q u ite  evident when i t  Chrysostom w rites  In another place*
*lhen you look a t  glaaasing Im iM inga, and the  aapeet 
■ of eolosa&dse a llu re s  your aye, then tu rn  a t  ones to  
the  v a u lt  a t  heaven and to  the  t r e e  p la in s  in  which 
herd* ®rmm a t  th e  water** b rink , flho does no t despise 
a l l  the c rea tio n s o f a r t  when a t  imam in  the s t i l ln e s s  
a t  h is  h e a r t he admires th e  r i s in g  sun, a s  i t  sheds 
I t s  golden l ig h t  over the  earth ! o r , whoa re s tin g  by 
a spring In the  deep grass m  wader th e  dark shade of 
thiofc»l»«v®d 'tree s , he f e a s ts  b is  eye on the  fmt 
d istance vanishing In  the  kas#f*§
thus wo see bow fu l ly  these early  C hristian  w rite rs  recognised 
th e  beauty o f nature a s  the work o f Divine Creation ..and even 
assented th is  recognition  by a tendency to  disparage, in  ©o*a- 
perIson, the- works o f  mu* I t  was only with S t Augustin© 
th a t  human a r t  found i t s  place In  C hristian  thougjbfc*
In th e  nmtmiiiim, in  those oases where a r t  did find
expression in  “Im ita tions” of natu re , the  charge o f a r t i f i c i ­
a l i t y ” was based <m mm o f two reasons# F irst#  any attem pt to  
im ita te  nature tended to  diminish i t s  sacramental character by 
d ire c tin g  man's a tte n tio n  .assy from i t s  .divine orig in*  Early 
C hris tian s mm, a s  'H ate  d id , the f a l s i ty  involved in  “im ita­
tio n s” which bad no o ther purpose than to  give as i l lu s io n  of
nature* Nature In it s  n a tu ra l s ta te  was preferred to  an 
i l lu s io n  of I t  fur i t  was the work of th e  Divine A rtis t*  Any 
human a r t ,  therefor® , i s  c o n tra s t to  tha  Divine Art of 
sensib le  r e a l i ty  was c a lled  “a r t i f i c i a l ”* Secondly, t h i s
%ide Bernard Boetequei, A  History of Asthetlc (Londons 
a&cMillSr 19105, p, 129* ~~
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disdain  tm  hvmm. a r t  m s  f t r t t o r  ImstmmtA beoaua# o f the  
deoaying character o f Hauam a rt*  At the  advent o f C hristian ity*  
the  a r t s  had lo s t  much o f th e ir  in sp ira tio n a l b asis  and had* in  
general degenerated in to  a purely sensuous display* Instead of 
being a  means o f in sp irin g  m n  to  a  Ilf® above him, the  Roman 
th ea tre  indulged the  sen su a lity  o f the body* C hristiana r e -  
noting to  th is  i l l i o i t  g ra t if ic a tio n  of the  senses re jec ted  
hvemn a r t  a s  fe s te r in g  levs so le ly  fo r the  tilings o f th is  
m rld * ^  This a t t i tu d e  towards human a r t  jrav a tle d  u n t i l  the  
t&m  of Augustins*
Mk® the ear l i a r  C h ris tian  fathers* St Augustine 
found everywhere in  nature o f  Cod aa A rtis t*  But he*
so re  than any o ther Church fa th e r developed I t s  philosophical 
im plications* The so im plications a lso  included the place of 
meat as a r t i s t*  ftrtw M s w ritings m  oan gate such in s ig h t 
in to  tfe® e a r ly  C hristian  meaning o f im ita tion  whan used in  a r t  
and applied  to  nature*
Philosophically , Augustin© m s  indebted to  th© Seo- 
P la to n ia t,5 P lo tinus fo r  assy  o f h is  Ideas* Vshatevar th is  
re la tio n sh ip  m y have bean, H o t tea s  doss sates several
%* J* Adler* Arte and Prudence. (Sew fork; Lcr.gsaans, 133?)* 
p* SS# la  r e f s r r tag"!© rti S ”e ^ r ly ',2'taf*lstian a tt i tu d e  towards 
the a rts*  Adler w rites th a t  th e ir  Ieve o f Sod always decided 
what «K8 to  be loved in  th# world* lie concludes* "Prim itive 
C h ris tia n ity  d id  mot
4
&eaanuel Ch&psaan* i t  Augustine’ s Philosophy of Beauty 
(mm York* Stood and i a r l ,  l l i ) , " p* 1 l C -----‘----
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a tp ilflean i; roBarks on tdwaiMlw* o f a r t  lehiah p a ra l le l  such o f 
what Augustine te n  to  any* For th is  reason* ho s s m i  os on 
ex ce llen t In troduction to  Augustine * s  obtarTatio&a on a rt*
tyt tWiAi 0 > * >■flflilffiM
Hith Plot© e y i A risto tle*  P lo tinus hod h isw elf adopted 
th# Ides- o f  a r t  o s  e s se n tia l  to  i t s  nature*
A rt mss prim arily  an in te l le c tu a l  thing* fh© e s se n tia l  cause 
was the  ids*  in  tte© w M i * !  In te lle c t*  t h i s  idea i s  th® ou- 
goaftaring fo ra  of art* "This f o r a ,3* wot® Plotinus* *i» in  
the  d to i^ is r  before m f  i t  ©sitors the stonoj and the a r t i f i c e r  
holds i t  » i  by M s equipsent o f  eyes and hoods hut by M s
<wfc®fc#wj&i*s .^ ,s tApis *1^* s n *■ * iSat* *# -* *it% dh*lik JI iu**du s **.4 ©**&»'£ mw 4*la —| i f i i ^ |% l l l l l  *B M 8 ISPbi 0i t« l
a r t i s t  in  h is  art*  tharo  i s  so  a rt*  A rt, i f  i t  I s  to  ho so* 
"mast o r ©ate in  th e  Snags o f  i t s  own nature and work by the  
Idea o r Wmmmrn^ Ihe- p rin c ip le , th e re fo re , o f the b e au tifu l 
etejesb* aaseely the *£)Iss o r Hessen** i s  order to  produce, w e t  
i t s e l f  be b e au tifu l in  a  " fa r higher purer degree sines i t  
i s  the  se a t and source of th a t  beauty* indwelling in  th© a r t  
sh leh  must n a tw a lly  be a w e  eoaplete than any comeliness o f
sflotiaue» gamada.TIlI, 1*11~3S la She Groat Books of the 
'Uss^re. _lbrld* e«ET toSSri it* Hutchins* trans**" 'S^'^en''WoSSnm 
«3r¥**ET*Spt (Chicago* laoywlsfssdis Britanniea* 1SS2),
7lb id . ,  T ill*  1, S7-38*
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th® ®:rfc«raal**8 I t  4s m  th® s id e  a# th e  in te l le c t  th a t  a r t  
has it® source asd l i f e ,  % *.every prime cause must he w ith in  
i ts e lf*  ware powerful than I t s  e f fe c t  can bet the m usical does 
»@t d a r is e  fro® an unmusical source but fresa musict and so tha  
a r t  exhibited  In the  m ateria l work derives from an a r t  y e t 
M #*ar*#s* I t  i s  in  th a  higher a r t  o f  th a  ’’Reason" th a t  a l l  a r t  
baa i t s  orig in#
On tha  r a le  o f im ita tion  in  a r t  P lo tinus i s  most emphatic. 
In  fast*  be « n »  th a t  a r t s  a re  n e t to  be a ligh ted  m  th e  ground 
th a t  they  c rea te  by im ita tion  o f  n a tu ra l objects* On the  
contrary , i t  i s  a  necessary condition  th a t  a r t  im ita te  n a tu ra l 
o b jec ts , Ju s t a s  n a tu ra l ob jec ts a re  themselves necessary 
im ita tions ©f tfes Ideas from which nature has i t s  source* In 
the a r t s ,  "we must recognise, * he ceuna ils , " th a t they give no 
bar® reproduction o f  the th ing  m m  b u t go beak to  the  Ideas 
from which nature I t s e l f  derives*"10 In doing th is*  the a r t i s t  
transcends nature and in  transcending I t  "adds where nature i s  
lacking#9** Per those who f a i l  in  th is#  do so because they a re
8Xfeid*» T i l l ,  1 , 5®*i§#
%McU,  T i l l ,  1, 52-57*
T i l l ,  1 , 58-60*
**Ibid»,  T i l l ,  1 , 62, ifesasanwcl Chapman, S t Augustine*s 
IMIosopCT-^of ^ Beauty, p# 110, a# 3 p ra ise s  th is  'above psai'tien  
'laT lle ',f S l S i n g l',wa^ r» *P1 o tiaus#*#fcrillian tly  maintained th a t  
a r t  i s  no t a  copy o f  a  copy b a t ascends to  the  p rin c ip les  on 
which na tu re  i s  b u i l t  up#*
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l a  th e  discernment o f tha p rin c ip le  producing 
beauty la  Sature and taowing nothing o f i t ,  content themselree 
to  "run a fte r  the  ou ter, norer understanding th a t i t  i s  th s  
inner ifeieb s t ir s  ua*12 both la  a r t  and in  n a tu re .
nature , l ik e  tb s  works o f a r t ,  a re  the embodiment o f 
th e  idea l archetypes In m ateria l fe rn s , - l e t  these  id ea l arche­
types in  th e  SCrld Soul a re  s t i l l  oore b e au tifu l than th® 
p rin c ip le s  in  n atsrs fo r  they are  p resen t In  th e ir  purity* 
Hcswrer, the a r t i s t  must discover in  some m a l l  any a t  le a s t ,  
the  ereatlur# soure® o f the  very f i r s t  Reason which i s  the 
p rin c ip le  o f Beauty In n a tu re . He can then take an lssaga o f I t  
fo r  as P lo tinus says, " there  can he no rep resen ta tion  of i t ,  
except In  the .sobs® th a t  we rep resen t gold by some portion  o f 
g e ld ."13
th is  "gold" i s  the  hidden dynamic p rin c ip le  o f a l l  
th ings th a t  come to  be by nature and by a r t .  I t  i s  th e  "gold" 
o f  wisdom which everywhere p resid es a t  w ak in g .^  5hs a r t i s t  
him self goes back, a f te r ' a l l ,  to  th a t  wlmim In  nature which i s  
ssfcedisd In  h im self, " th is  i s  n e t a wisdom b u i l t  up of tbeoraa 
hu t mm to ta l i ty !  not a  wisdom composed or consisting  o f nanl* 
fo ld  d e ta i l  co-ordinated in to  a  unity* but ra th e r , & unity
% t ld „  f i l l ,  2 , 4S-4« .
13Ibid«, f i l l ,  S, 14-25,
M Ib ld .# f i l l ,  8, 1 -3 . •
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ISworking c u t lat® d e ta il*
H its coiHlitiaa o f “u n ity  working out in to  d e ta il*  1* 
what could bo t#w©4 ttafi&mm* d e f in itio n  o f the a r t i s t i c  
process* I t  I h m i s  possib le  only a f te r  th® a r t i s t  ocnteBt-
tg
p la te s  nature and w ttti th© “eye*1 ©£ th e  aoul p a rtic ip a te s
in  th a  jrlae tp l©  of c re a t iv i ty  th a t  tha 3©ul o f Eatur© oarrioa
1?cm and th a t  i s  th© source o f ereatlv© « » r g r  w ith in  the  a rts*  
Ones experienced* th© a r t i s t  seas "no iser® bloc® upon the  
surface" of nature but a  penetration  of tha  soul o f m o  by th e  
Soul o f labor©* fhere i s  ttnsi meM«m4 a  v is io n  which no 
longer sees the  divine a s  sows th ing  ex te rn a l hu t which bse«a»a 
it*"^® f s  sake e x p lic i t  the unique meaning o f th is  "vision* 
P lo tinus wrote, "aims© s ig h t d ea ls  with th© ex ternal there  ©an 
be her© no v ision  unless in  th© sens© o f id e n tif ic a tio n  with 
th© objects* I t  I s  th is  id e n tif ic a tio n  which allows th© 
a r t i s t  to  grasp the Idas® from which nature i t s e l f  derives* 
fh© a r t i s t  im ita tes  th©s© Ideas which, a re  th© p rinc ip les’ of 
nature a s  w all a s  o f  .a rt and in  v ir tu #  o f which belli nature  and 
a r t  subsist*
16Ibld«* fill* , i* 3- 10 .
iS Ibi£** I* i* 9* By oouiamplobion alona w© can aoquir© 
the "only eye th a t  soas the mighty beauty o f  th© One#0
17?id© K* I* G ilbert and Helmut Kuhn, 4 H istory  o f
E«th©tioSr~pp. 116-116,
l ®Pl©tinu8, iM d*.  f ill .*  10* 4ft-*9»
19 |b id .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
u&  brief*  these  e re  Plotinus* thoughts ®» a rt*  Var 
doubtedly M e Insistence  upon i t*  e s se n tia l  transcendental 
character pointed the  way fo r St Augustine#
Following in  the philosophic tr a d i t io n  o f P lo tinus,
2QAugustine considered ar t  to  he jr-issarily th e  work o f reason*
I t  .is in  the  go Mualoa th a t  Augustin® lu c id ly  poin ts ou t tb s
dependence o f a r t  upon reason* Like the  lower animals* man
makes* hu t unlike them* he ashes according to  reason* Bo
s i t e s  th® examples o f b ird s  making th e ir  n e s ts  and oven a r t i s t s
mairi^g works asesrd lhg  to  clever im ita tions o f sensible
appearances* S e iih s r, s tr te b ly  speaking, possess art* fho
b ird  does m  in s t in c tiv e ly  and does not possess a kaowledgo o f
M s a r t ,  lb* m m  i s  tru e  with seme a r t i s t s  who do not possess
a  knowledge o f th e ir  a r t  bu t do so , through -memory or o lever
im ita tion  o f  appearances* She word "art'* cannot bo given t ®
th a t  uhlch i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  sensib le  im ita tion  because
****•11 who follow  m s  and what i s  pleasing in  
i t  commit to  memory* mA in  th is  way by moving 
th o ir  body acquire a  c e r ta in  power o f  im itations 
mA th a t  they do not haws science a van i f  they moo 
to  do wm y th in g s c leverly  and s k i l l f u l ly  unless 
they possess i s  the  p u rity  and tru th  o f  the  in te l le c t  
th® very th ing  they profess o r exhibit#*2*
20$t Augustin®, P® lluaiea I , 4, g, in She Fathers of the 
Church Series, ed*, ludirig1 leKbpp (Sew fork* IM f)’#
21Ibld*,  I ,  4 , i#
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0I t  is  th is  "pu rity  and tru th  of the i n te l le c t” which 
excludes e a r  possible attem pt to  leave a r t  exclusively  on the 
le v e l  of the ceases. I t  m ist r i s e  to th e  le v e l of the  
in te l le c t  where* fo r  S t Augustine, in  a d iv ine  illum ina tion , 
the  mind becomes one w ith  the  th ing  contemplated and sees 
th ings in  th e i r  p r is t in e  splendour. There and only there  can 
a r t  be t r u ly  engendered* The a r t i s t ,  in  th is  pu rity  of mind, 
sees things in  th e  perfection  which they could not a t t a in  in  
n a tu re , and in  M s a r t ,  re s to re s  things to th is  lev e l of d e lig h t­
fu l  contem plation.22 bbat i s  re a lis e d  e x te r io r ly  in the pleas­
ing work of a r t  i s  f i r s t  seen In te r io r ly  by the a r tis a n  in  h is 
a r t* 2*
St Augustine enriched h is  view o f a r t  w ith the  know­
ledge of d iv ine rev e la tio n . The revealed tru th  o f  c rea tion  
made him profoundly aware o f the  fa c t  th a t everything in  
natu re  was the  product of th e  Divine C reator. In contemplat­
ing the sensib le  world a l l  th ings spoke the grace of God’s 
c re a tio n , itie n n e  Gilson a lludes to t h i s  divine gratu itousness 
which re f le c ts  S t Augustine’ s sacramental a tt i tu d e  towards created  
th in g s .
2% hia sin g le  expression "d e lig h tfu l contemplation” contains 
the two aspects which St Augustine considered e sse n tia l fo r  an 
ae s th e tic  experience. There I s  d e lig h t a r is in g  from contemplation. 
Vide 1 . Chapman, i b id . ,  pp. 8-9.
2% f . 8* Chapman, ib id . ,  p . I l l ,  n . 13.
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•th e re  i s  not ®m o f  His lood’ s] works wfaioh i s  
as* a  grace*»»toe© they are  md® to  the Image 
o f the  Cr»a-ter*#*& grjos so to  apo&k universal 
and mwmn, to  all**®*
St Augustine considered a l l  created  th ings to  th i s  sacramental
lig h t*  th ings to  nature war© too im ita tions o f  the  forms t o
Sod’s mind* Sod mss Himself too toomftor eauso of ereated
bo tog and sensib le  th ings wore prim arily  im itations of too
divine fom s*
Sim ilar i ly ,  whan too a r t i s t  contemplated toe Divine
A rt ho rose  to  a  d iro o t im ita tion  o f  too forms which nature
I t s e l f  imitated*®6 Be would no t concern him self with the
f a l s i ty  and i l lu s io n  o f try in g  to  ©ajsture the  im itotion# t o
nature of th em  forms* The a r t i s t ,  did not copy nature but
toaaseended nature to  thorn fo m s which nature i t s e l f  copied*
Such a  traaaeendtog a c t iv i ty  allowed to e  a r t i s t  to  v isu a lise
toe forms o f  th ings to  th e ir  perfections and to  give expression
to  toe*" to  M s work*
Augustins*a notion of im ita tion  to  a r t ,  toother toe
Pivto© A rt of mature o r human a r t ,  s tre sse s  the onto logical
1* Sileon, Introduction a  L’gtude da Saint Augustin 
(Paris* Libra iris '"p*"'IWi"'' ’’S tont'le"Sou-
▼erain bien. Men m suffit* ©‘©at done lilsremeiit et g ra tu ite -  
meat qu’ i l  dense to u t e© qu*il donne, e t, ea e© sens, 11 a ’e s t  
auounc 4* see oeuvres qui m  se it wm grace* ,**Ea m seas to -  
projre la. nature ©lie w&m s a r a i t  done wa© grace, •••ssais one 
gr&®© pear atosi d ire  univarsell© et eomuEta a tons*
26S* Ctopw®, Ibid*, p* 111, n* 3* “Mature fo r  Augustin©
was a copy of th e  ideas to  God’ s  mind, and a r t  copies these 
idea* and not the  esp ies in  nature o f these ideas**
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mt e a l s  o f is& tation* The emphasis fo lio  on t t e  ©©ntomglatjUm 
of the in te l l ig ib le  forms A tafe only the  mini can see* To 
8 t Augustine* these  forms or awhar® eonstitut®  the in te l ­
l ig ib le  p r la s ip ls s  fo r im ita tion  f a  a rt*
I t  oa# with. Jtto itemaa AfUimas th a t  th© s a r l i t r  
C hristian  Idealism  o f  S t Augustin® m m  to  an «nd* Re per­
formed # ie  same serv ice far- S t Augustiae, a s  A risto tle  had 
fo r  Plato* The Implies t lo a  i s  th a t  he re in teg ra ted  the  r e a l  
l a  the oorporeal and asaribed  duo r e a l i ty  t o  sensib le  being*
St Itema® therefor© reeogaised th e  v a l id i ty  o f tfe© A ris to te ­
l ia n  ghyaiea o r n a tu ra l philosophy* A ll e x is tin g  th in g s te d
d trfk aH W K jIk  * Bata «S if lJ tl  X *m . A l f c .  -fiyim VIMS — — .«*M—***** —  ■* lift « * tr . He Jm a a d rifflM  Wrt MMtiBrol# *H to rn  S3iy  HW
forms tout mer# real la  virtue of thoir em exlstenee* things 
wbrf® jffi ast* they mere sotually 'muRFiag and i t  -mas the mind's 
privilege to grasp the In te llig ib ility  o f sensible nature*
This poin t o f contact tebeesm natu re  and the mind gave 
Atomism tha advantage o f  learning th a t  whioh mm m m r imama  toy 
the  F la toa lsis*  th a t  mm a teesledgo o f sensib le  re a lity *  
ftas®* t he mind eould know the  sensib le  wad r e a l ,a s  s e l l  a s  the  
in b e t \  11 IHase an A^tm. re teh sd  the  m in A t  only through
th® in strum en ta lity  o f  the  senses* i t  followed th a t  the 
most f i r s t  o f  a l l  be in  sm stest with nature* So in  restoring
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th e  seiaeaae o f r e a l  things* S t moans gwra moaning mam aero  to  
tbo  A ris to te lia n  AAeSMi#* ®Art im ita te#  m ta rs* "
i t  moans* notion  o f  im ita tio n  in  a r t  follows th a t  o f 
A ris te tis*  Basically* i t  i s  th e  same* Inst ho makes i t  a«ro 
ox p iie it#  A rt should im itate  nature n e t by m gyin g her work 
t o t  by working an oho dean  A rts  S n U stw  n a tu m  Aft out. 
eparationo«^  Asoordtng to  i t  S ta n u  th is  notion o f 
*l» ltatfs#i*  f i n i s  i t s  ^ u a tifio n tio n  in  # 1 0  amlogoua r e la t io n  
sadisting botwo®® a a tw a  and a r t*  Bott nature  ami ®*t find  
th e i r  source in  in te llig en ce*  la  ta ro  i s  tha  r e s u l t  o f th© 
n a t iv i ty  o f  the  Bivte© Mtndj2^ almreaa a r t  la  the  p ro te s t of 
'the bussan aiod  ufaAeh has boon brought to  bear mature#
Sow* -«&mm a l l  a s t m  r«fre«*»t*i th# work o f tb s  Divine A rtis t#  
th e  huraan a r t i s t  should study i t  th a t  ho nay loam  to  earry  on 
the  merit of ©rooties* fh© a r t i s t#  i s  being a  pupil o f  nature 
is# a t  the aamati©©, th e  pup il o f  Sod#28 So should conform
28St Thomas Aquinas* teaBBft meetog&ae, I* 117# 1* 
w***I©s##ae oat quod operatisaes 'arti'a iiaitim ttr »iturae«##,f
2f Ibid*-* 1* 91, 3* *,***0®n©8 re#  natural©® produetae
te n t  ablSfSi i i r i n a t  mdo aunt ©uodaiasBd© a r t if ie i& ta  ipa iu s 
Bel#*
“^ " I f  tha a r t i s t  stud ios and ahorisbos o a t r *  • • • i t  i s  not 
to  copy nature  M l to  base him self upon nature •«#he mast bo Qod*s 
pupil# fo r Sod Serna tim  l'rulea,l gov«rniag th e  making o f work* o f  
taftu tr*  Hiture o o a o n u  tb s  a r t i s t  e  s s^ n tia llv . sIiqdI v becauses* ■* w*#*#•* wwne a* e»ei|*<**p,ww^#e's^» y w^#eejp#u 'Wweewmwmvtwwwr
i t  i s  a  dsrivatiom  fro® tb s  d iv ine a r t  in  things***Tha a r t i s t  
whether ha knows i t  o r not* i s  consu lting  God ahem ho looks a t  
things*** Jae$esa M*ritain* A rt and Soholastiefaga* p* SO#
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mhim self to  m  f a r  m  I t  i s  possib le  to  to* Greater** manner o f 
producing la nature* Xta a s  a r t i s t  to ita to *  God a* a r t i s t  l a  
th a t  to* working o f  M i tot *r*atto it human boto a re
products o f  teto llip® ® ## Art* .Ills* nature jroeeeds la orderly  
fash ion , adopting and do to rato iag  s m «  su itab le  to  to* a t ta to -
uumK'k Sf Art- titan, i*  In— » »a*lr4«<i> in  toe.spHvsas we* JpW ^weoess^pFSp1 •^fc;w:**e* eei^fcewr eeMH4WMh
image o f divto® making* fo r  a r t  im ita te s  the  prooessos o f 
nature o f which tod i*  to* producer* I t  i s  l a  th is  seas* th a t  
fa th e r  Leonard ealiahan  in te rp re ts  to*  fhaadotic doctrine o f 
im ita tio n  t o t  a r t*  H «  concludes to a t im ita tion  t o  a r t  I s  “not 
a  se rv ile  copying o f  nature*# models* h a t  [ ra th e r]  ha* recourse 
to  nature a s  pup il to  teacher* A rt copies not nature bu t her 
toys**
I t  thaaas* l ik e  A r is to tle  did  sot* therefore* consider
a r t  to  be a  s lav ish  W h t e  o f nature* to# dootrto* o f exact
reproduction m i  not to  b* to le ra ted*
a& dtfttioB a s  reproduction or rap*9Sant&tion o f too 
r e a l  *  to  other words* S a lta tio n  aa to r  to l ly  considered 
-  i s  merely a  means* no t an endj "'^I'r'r®latos* along 
with manual d e x te r ity  to  the  a r t i s t i c  ac tiv ity *  h u t no 
sera  e o a s titu to s  it*, to d  th* thing* made present to  
tha aoul by the sensib le  hp toeis o f  a c t  * by rhythm, 
sound* line* ooloyr* fsmt*. volts®®* words* astro* 
mym® ans. image* two prox3,tfte to  tsatstor 01 a r t  *» arc  
themselves ®0r » l y " ' a ' o f  '^© '’beauty 
o f too work* just, l ik e  too syntools to  questions toay 
a re  the  asabt»r« os to  eoeak» a t  th a  d iaoossl*^4* * *P*W4*'4* "awl* *»*P* **^ ***4* WJ ** 4*^*
of too ajfff‘^ * r’''ee S l t f ^  he must make too b r i l l ia n c e
2%eonard Callahan* 0*?** A theory of Bathetic* According 
to  #** 3% Thomas Aquinas t& iw rs ify ,
m ? ) *  pp,
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of for®, tls# l ig h t  b®i«S to tes*  to  s e t  up to# 
perfection  o f  to fto t towi ovuidflrad  a*
an wad w »M  tocrefo ro  law Sa* srdsrtog, oneself w ito 
a  v ie*  to  what in  purely a a to r ia l  to  to* work of 
to t*  *  aa rv il*  im ita tion  abso lu te ly  foreign  to  art*"5®
Beni dec* on abso lu te  f tdslltgr to  m tu rs  to to  lim it a r t
to  too lev s! o f  too #y»* and to  to  violeaoa to  man*# to to lto o to -
a li ty *  too a r t i s t  s tu d io s aster®  no t to o t  to  m y  photograph
oaa o f I t#  aspsot# but to  too* In sp ira tio n  fra *  i t*  fo t h i s
• s te n t  t o t  -must depend upon no tore* But to® a r t i s t  r e f le c t#
upon too asteal, toon generalises frcaa too various forms of
aster® in  order to  envisage too  ob jec t conceived in  i t s  ideal#
Wrnim too  "brllliaao®  o f for®** of a  th ing  i s  too resplendence
o f  i t s  ideal*  to® a r t i s t  engrosses th i s  fo m  by m n ife s t ls g
too  in te l l ig ib le  p rin c ip le  through a©s® sensib le a r te r ia l*
th is  i s  to a t  Father Callahan terms ®to# e sse n tia l of to#
a r t i s t i c  beauty according to  too fhom istle theory -  too
expression of t o t  id ea l by to# tmm$ t e t t a t t e *  i» to  be
understood to  'to®' m s s  o f m anifestation  o f  t h i s  p rin c ip le  o f
in te l l ig ib i l i ty , ,  th e  ideal*" l e  adds re fe rr in g  to  t o t  w*»*it#
mission i s  n o t to  copy to® re a l  b u t to  id e a lise  toe- r o d  and
re a l is e  'to* id e a l* " ^
But I t  i s  possible to  say these th ings on a r t  only I f
there  i s  a  piitictopliF ®f na tu re , d ls tto e t*  a t  one®* from
^Jaogue* t e r i t a t e ,  A rt tod  Sohelasticjga , pp* 4S-48*
S lU  Callahan, ib id*,  p.* 100»
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TB M W  AS3I8STIC POSITIONS
The fhileaogfoloai Background
Rene D escartes, the  fa th e r o f modern philosophy, 
expressed a marked an tipathy  fear poetry  and fo r a r t ,  in  general, 
This an tipathy , however, was p e rfeo tiy  consisten t w ith h ia  
philosophical system# To him, the only ideas th a t were worth­
while examining were o lear and d ia t ia o t  ideas, fe r  these alone 
were worthy of science, and capable of w ithstanding the 
"scru tiny  o f Reason,** Since h is  so le  passion was to  estab­
l i s h  science on a firm  b a s is , he was no t in te re s ted  in  poetry 
and the l ik e ,  fo r  these d id  not he lp  h is  science. This i s  
p a r tic u la r ly  evident from what he wrote to  the f i r s t  p e rt of 
the Disoours he to  Mstoode, concerning poetry and h is to ry ,
"Besides, f i c t i t i o u s  n a rra tiv e s  lead us to  image 
the p o s s ib il i ty  of many events th a t  a re  impossible! 
and even the most f a i th fu l  h is to r ie s ,  i f  they do 
s e t  wholly m isrepresent m atters or exaggerate th e ir  
importance to  render the  account more worthy of 
perusal, s a l t ,  a t  l e a s t ,  almost always toe  meanest 
and le a s t  s tr ik in g  o f the a ttendan t eirciaaataneesi 
henee i t  happens th a t  toe remainder dees not t e l l  
toe tru th , and such as regu la te  th e ir  conduct by 
examples drawn f ra n  th i s  source, a re  ap t to  t o l l  
to te  extravagances o f to ig h t-e rra n ts  o f Romanes
%ene D escartes, Diaeours De La Methods, ed. Etienne 
Gilson (Paris* L ib ra trie  Pkilosophiqu®,'' 194V), I I ,  p . 14 •
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and to  entert& ia p ro jec ts  wfeioh exoeed th e ir  
powers*"2 '
>B*e1ry and h is to ry  were two such f ie ld s  which d e a lt w ith such
extravagances and they  were t© he avoided for. not represen ting
the tru th*  th a t  i s  t© say, of c le a r and d is t in e t  ideas*
Severer#less. D escartes, while he considered only c lea r
and d is t in c t  ideas worthy of science, d id  make roost fo r confused
ideas when he ineluded under tha  d encffijinatioa,,thought "every-
th ing  w ith in  the  mind*
"By the word th c u ^ it, I  understand a l l  th a t  
which ta le s  place in  us th a t  we o f ourselves 
a re  immediately conscious o f i t j  and, accordingly , 
not only to  understand.( in te l l lg e re ,  entendre) 
to  w ill  (v e lle ) , to  'im ^ |1 S ^ Q iS ^ i)7 ^ 5 5 r© v e n  
to  perceive (ae n tire , ' aem tir}, apT here  th e  m m  
a s  to  th in k  *
He designated generally by the  tom  idea a ll th a t was in  the
mind. With t h i s  Descartes admitted the presence of any kind
o f ideas, whether c le a r and d is t in c t ,o r  confused.
On© o f Descartes successors, Ctottfried Leibnitz saw
the used fo r d is tingu ish ing  w ithin the  mind, the c lea r ideas
which belonged to  science and th e  confused ideas which
Descartes adm itted but re jec ted  as u n f i t  fo r s c ie n tif ic
knowledge* Leibnitz observed*
"An idea i s  obsoure when i t  i s  no t su ff ic ie n t
2Ib id ,,  I ,  rn* 6-7 .
%eae Desoartes, Ifce P rincip les o f Philosophy, 1, IX, in
A Discourse on Method, 'l^ l^ 'tlo n s  'and'' She felnoiplea of
Desoartes, hrans* JSrn ?eitoh (Hew York* g*P* Dutton, 1929), 
p n g f e ....
isSaiPTIBSIilliKf-M .'SaSS'?
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to  enable us to  reccgpise the  th ing  represeated*«,
Knowledge then is  c le a r  when i t  i s  su ff ic ie n t to  
enable me to  re e o g a iz e th e  th ing  represented , end 
i s  fu rther e ith e r  confused or d is tin c t*  confused. 
idhea I  cannot ©numerate separatoIy^E e marks 
necessary to  separate one tiling from other s , „ J u s t  
as we o ften  see p a in te rs  or o ther a r t i s t e  who judge 
very c o rre c tly  th a t  a  work Is  good or defec tive , 
w ithout being ab le  to  account fo r  th e i r  judgment, 
and who rep ly  to  those who ask  th e ir  opinion, th a t ,  
th a t  of which they  disapprove lacks something,
I knew no t what»»«'*4
thus, though a r t i s t s  judged w ith confused perceptions they s t i l l
possessed a grade of in te l le c tu a l  knowledge, he ibn its  held ,
th e re fo re , th a t  th e re  were two grades o f knowledge, Ihe confused
ideas made up of " l i t t l e  perceptions" such a s  the vague congeries
e f  th e  d rea » -s ta te , and the  d i s t in c t  and c le a r  knowledge of
s a ie n tif io  explanation. I t  was on th is  lev e l of confused per*
captions th a t  le ib a i tz  placed tile a r t i s t*  s knowledge. He makes
proper judgments bu t cannot say why, "SaSte as d istinguished
from understanding c o n sis ts  in  confused perceptions o f which
aae cannot adequately render an account, "® I t  was obvious to
Leibnitz th a t  these ideas ware simply neglected by D escartes,
and they needed to  be d istingu ished  from the  c le a r ideas of
s c ie n t if ic  explanation*
C hristian  von Wolff made note of th i s  d ifference  be*
tween c le a r  and confused ideas and agreed th a t  the d is tin c tio n
*The Philosophical Works o f L eibn itz , t ra n s , 6,M*Duaean,
2nd ed* (few 'Haven't "'futile’,  "Morehouse As ¥ayl«r,  1908), PP* 28*29,
% ide Km Fm G ilbert and 1 ,  Kuhn, A H istory of E sthe tics , 
p . t t £
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was la  accord with. th» ligjht o f reason*56
A. Q, Baumgarten who inherited  the ra tionalism  of Wolff,
and tha  d is t in c tio n  sad® by h e ib n its , claimed fo r  th e  ecmfusod 
ideas the r ig h t o f an independent science* He iso la ted  a 
region of the mind, the "lower apprehension" and located the 
oenfused ideas there* the mind* therefore* had an "upper" 
and "lower" region* the "upper apprehension" was the fac u lty  
o f d is t in c t  and c le a r  ideas which was proper to  philosophy*
But the lo g ic a lly  precise  ideas appropriate  to  science did  
not s u i t  poetry* I t  was* th e re fo re , f rom the region o f the 
"lower apprehension* th a t  the confused ideas and adumbrations 
o f poetry* beauty and a r t  were to  be found*6
According to  Baumgarten7* reason was competent to  deal
w ith these confused ideas a s  an independent science* the 
science gave the ru le s  fo r knowing sensibly* and was occupied 
w ith the  perfec tion  of sensib le  knowledge* He concluded th a t  
th is  p a rt o f ra tio n a l science (th a t i s  to  say* th a t p a rt which 
was as ra t io n a l  as the  p a rt th a t  d ea lt with c lea r and d is t in c t  
ideas) was ca lled  A esthetics*
I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t to  note th a t  that^wbieh Descartes
56Ibid** p* 290* "Bamgarten*s philosophical fa th e r , the 
schoolmaster WOlff, gave h is  successor l i t t l e  more than the 
pedant*# method and c a re ."
6Ibid** pp. 289-296.
7Vide Benedetto Drees* Aesthetic* trans* Douglas A in slie , 
(LondcSTlkcM Han, 1909), p 7 £ ? 6 . '
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excluded its being unwortlyof reason i s  mow d e a lt with by reason. 
Poetry, a r t  ami beauty mow qojbs under th® lig h t  o f reason. Son® 
of the omnicorapoteuco of reason i s  denied. In fa c t ,  reason  
stakes another conquest; a r t  f a l l s  under the  donate o f ra tio n a lism .
But with K&nt th is  consideration  of A esthetics a s  a 
separate seience met with d e fin ite  opposition . la n t  saw no 
reason to  consider A esthetics as a  separate  se ience. He 
sp e c if ic a lly  c r i t i c i s e s  th e  r a t io n a l i s t ic  method of attem pting 
to  base ta s te  on reason. I t  was hopeless because ta s te  o r the 
©omfused ideas of the “lower apprehension* were always 
em pirical.
"The Germans" wrote Kant, "are th® only people who 
cu rren tly  made use of the  word ♦aesthetic* in  order 
to  s ig n ify  what o thers term the c rit iq u e  of t a s te .
This usage o rig inated  in  th® abortive attem pt made 
by Bamgarten, te a t  admirable a n a ly tic a l th inker, 
to  bring  the c r i t i c a l  treatm ent of tee  beau tifu l 
under ra tio n a l p rin c ip le s , and so to  ra is e  i t s  ru le s  
to  tee  rank of a sc ience. The said ru le s  or c r i t e r i a  
a re , a s regards th e ir  c h ie f  sources, merely em pirical, 
and consequently can never serve as determ inate a 
p r io r i t is e s  by which our judgment of ta s te  must So
I t  was on th is  account te a t  Kant refused to  accept Baumgarten's 
"aesth e tic  region" as a separate  science. Kant maintained te a t  
t e a t  Baumgarten d e a l t  s i t e  separa te ly , could be trea te d  under 
Criticism* (The C ritique o f T aste ).
Moreover, Sant wanted to  reserve the name "aesthetics*
8Immanuel S a n t's  C ritique of Pure Reason, b rans . Herman 
Kemp S 'S ' l 'K r '1 'fcrla'' " I S S i l l e s 'H r e s s i ' " p .  66.
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f a r  iii# c r i t i c a l  r e f a c t io n s  ©a seas© oognition# Ia n t was 
aware th a t  th ere  ex isted  an a c t iv i ty  e the r than th e  in te l le c ­
tive*  This new department o f knowledge m s  th a t o f *aesthetioaw 
which was based not on reason in  the  seam  of Baumgarten, but 
on a  p r io r i  p rincip les*  He speaks o f these p rin c ip les  o f sense 
knowledge in  the  f i r s t  sec tion  of the  C ritique of Pure Reason*
’’The e ffe c t o f an object upon the  fa c u lty  of 
rep resen ta tion , so fa r  as we a re  a ffec ted  by i t .
Is  sensation* That in tu i t io n  which i s  in  re la tio n  
to  iW  object through sensation i s  e n ti t le d  
empirical* The undetermined ob jec t of an ssaperioal 
in tu i t io n  i s  e n ti t le d  appearance* That in  the 
appearance which corresponds 'W 'sensation  I  term 
i t s  m atter |  bu t th a t which so determines the  mani­
fo ld  o f appearano®, I  term  the fo ra  of appearanoe*
That in  which alone the  sensations can be posited 
and ordered in  a  c e r ta in  fo ra  cannot i t s e l f  be 
sensatlont and th e re fo re , while the  m atter of a l l  
appearance i s  given to  us a p o s te r io r i only, i t s  
form must l i e  ready fo r  the  sanw E ons a p r io r i  
in  the mind, and m  must allow  of being” sonsfefared 
apart from a l l  sensation#**9
Thus sensations do not en te r the mind, u n t i l  the  mind has given
them fcna* This i s  n e ith e r sensation nor in te lligence*  I t  i s
pare in tu itio n , th© mm o f  th© a p r io r i  p rin c ip le s  o f sen s ib ility *
Kant, th e re fo re , concludes* "There must, then e x is t  a  science
th a t  forms the  f i r s t  p a rt of th e  transcendental doctrine  of
elements, d i s t in c t  from th a t  which con tains the p rin c ip le s  of
pure thought and i s  called  Transcendental log ic*”*0 This new
science he c a l l s  the Transcendental A esthetic  and i t  i s  a
^Ibid*, pp# 65—66* 
1QIb id „  p . 66.
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constructive means by ishioh man acqu ires sensib le  knowledge.
Consequently w ith Kant, the explanation of knowledge 
Is  an ae s th e tic  one, th a t  i s  to  say, a  construction or produc­
tio n  o f knowledge, wherein sense experience gives the m atter o f 
knowledge and reason gives th e  fo m  o f knowledge. Iho r e s u l t  
i s  a composite, a terbium  quid, which was v a lid  s c ie n tif ic  
knowledge. Knowledge, fo r  Kant, was e s se n tia lly  a productive 
a c t iv i ty .
According to  S M aritain the whole Kantian theory i s ,  
in  r e a l i ty ,  an a r t i s t i c  making. He accu ra te ly  describes th is  
when he wrote* "Dos lo rs  cCBmg^e o * e ^ t ^ ^ r ^ u er nous no 
connaiasons quo ce qua nous fa iao n s. Voila 1*8x1crae secre t 
qul demine tou te  la  philosophic speculative de Kant.**^ So the 
axiom "to know i s  to  make" i s  a t e r  so statement of the  Kantian 
theory o f knowledge* The mind molds Hie raw m ateria l of 
experience as a sculptor molds h is  m arble.
Thus Kant in  h is  theery  of knowledge made unw itting 
use of a e s th e tic  p rin c ip le s  ( i . e .  in  the  sense of the  A ris to te lia n  
p rin c ip le s  of n a tu ra l philosophy) in  order to  give an explanation 
of sense cognition* Since Kant, th e re fo re , had an a e s th e tic  to  
explain knowledge, any explanation of a r t  would have been 
absurd because i t  would have involved a  redup lica tion  of sh a t he
**Jacques Mari ta in .  R eflections Sur L* In te llig en ce , So ed. 
(Paris* Bescle®, 1S3Q), pp. 1 "  ""...... .......
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M l already  said  concerning knowledge*
Moreover, a l l  o f Kant’ s theory of knowledge was for the
sake of providing ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r the  science of physios which,
eplstsm ologieally  speaking, was the  only tru e  science with
ob jective  v a lid ity *  This po in t M Gilson has observed whan he
wrote*® concerning Kant,
”***he not only considered Hewton’ s Method a s  the  
only v a lid  method, but a lso  th a t he took the f e e t  
fo r  granted th a t  the r e a l  world was exactly  as 
Sewton had described i t*  the Srttteus of Pure Reason 
i s  a m asterly  d escrip tio n  o f wKat'the s tru c tu re  of 
the human mini should be , in  order be aooount fo r 
the  ex istence of a Hewteaian conception of nature 
and assuming th a t conception to  be tru e  to  re a lity * "
bu t th is  physios dees n e t deal w ith those problems which
Baumgarten would t r e a t  in  h is  A esthetic* Thus by making i t  the
business of the  understanding to  deal w ith these problems,Kant
had no philosophy of a r t ,  i f  by philosophy of a r t  I s  meant, a t
l e a s t  in  one of i t s  important p a rts , an explanation o f the
m atter and form of works o f a r t*
Physics being what i t  m s  since the days of Descartes
and l i t t l e  changed as f a r  as i t  i s  a  type of science when Kant
re fle c te d  upon i t ,  had nothing to  do w ith the problem of a r t
and beauty* This same physios being a su b s titu te  fo r the
philosophy of n a tu re ,13 l e f t  th e  philosopher o f nature  (the
Etienne Gilson, The Unity o f Philosophical Experience 
(Hew York* Soribner, 19S7y,T" p . ' 'm .  1
13¥ide Jacques M aritain, la  Philosophie DeLa N ature,p* 37* 
D escartes "Relieved in  a  philosophy of nature w^ldh m s  id e n tif ie d
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A ris to te lia n  p h y sic is t)  unemployed* The one plaoe remaining 
fo r dare loping a philosophy of a r t  was metaphysics* But with
14
Sant th is  had given away to  c ritic ism *
I f ,  through pride  or soma other understandable human 
motive* tha  poets wanted a science to explain  art*  they had 
l i t t l e  a lso  to do then accept Kant’s critical-ph ilosophy*
In consequence* when the  modern a ss th e tlc ia n  came to  
the sub ject of a rt*  he found th a t  he had only two possible 
d isc ip lin e s  where a theory of a r t  could be discussed* Tha 
f i r s t  was in  the realm of metaphysics* the second was in  
physics or em piriologioal science* erroneously c a lled  the  
philosophy of nature*
However* in  metaphysics, the modern r a t io n a l is t ic  
d isdain  fo r anything sensible excluded the p o s s ib il i ty  of 
providing the n a tu ra l p rin c ip les  of nature , much lo ss  of a rt*
in  h is  mind w ith a lo g ic a l mathematical explanation of things* 
Since by h is  own d e f in itio n  ("That the  nature o f a  body consist*
• • • in  extension a lorn*** Hie P rincip les o f ffailoaophy, L, XXIII, 
p* 174) the c o n s titu tio n  of n a tu ra l "ISoS'le s”' was reducib le to  
extension, the only possib le  knowledge of them was through a 
mathematical reading of the  sensible* Thus the philosophy of 
nature was made in to  a m echanistic conception which denied 
a l l  knowledge of sensible r e a l i ty  except q uan tita tive  knowledge* 
Suohwas the O artaaiaa philosophy of nature which took the 
plaoe of the A ris to te lia n  n a tu ra l philosophy in  modern 
thought* I t  i s  known a lso  a s  em pirical science*
•^ Isananuel Kant’s C ritique of Pure Season, trans*
H*M«aau.S*''d e fa c e  TtTllaesn^ M 'ltion ,~. p» fed* " I t  i s  therefor© 
th® f i r s t  and’''mostr'"'fiporTS ' i t ' ’'•&& sfc' o'F philosophy to deprive 
metaphysics* one® and fo r a l l ,  of i t s  in ju rio u s  influence, 
by a ttack ing  i t s  e rro rs  a t  th e ir  very source*"
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nThe same was true in  the emplriological sciences* Sensible 
reality* haring been reduced to the common denominator of 
quantity was fenowable only in terms of observation and measure­
ment* the resu lt was the same as that produoed by a meta­
physical or sp ir itu a lis t  ivory towerism* neither metaphysios 
or empiriological science was competent to  deal with the 
natum l principles o f nature*
The position o f  the modern aesthetician i s  thus olearly  
marked off* I f  he lim its  h is  theory of art to explanations 
that an invocation of exclusively  metaphysical principles 
permits* he can treat only o f the transcendental or 'Vertical* 
aspects o f  art* If* however* he turns to  other sources for h is  
princip les, none of them w ill  be philosophical* He i s  left*  
therefore* in  the d if f ic u lt  position o f elaborating an aesthetics  
either on the double foundation of metaphysical principles and 
erapiriological principles* or on the single foundation o f an 
arbitrary se t of princip les. The la tter  alternative i s  not 
without merits, for a t least* i t  gives an unity to h is  explana­
tions which the hybrid aesth etics lacks* But in either ease* 
the principles thus used to estab lish  a basis for aesth etics  
invariably prove to be inadequate and unsatisfactory*
One contemporary aesthete who has given testimony to  
the fu t i l i t y  of rooting aesth etics in  any such double founda­
tion , or in  aay arbitrary set o f principles* i s  Benedetto Croce*
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ISla  an appendex to h is  Aasthetio, he enunciates five  aesthetic  
misconceptions which resu lt d irec tly  from th is  confusion over 
stoat constitutes the proper foundation for the science of  
aesthetics* In th is  c la ss if ic a tio n  Mr Croce considers those 
erroneous conceptions which stem from attempts to ju s t ify  
aesthetics on ground foreign to  the nature of art* For th is  
reason the c la ss if ic a tio n  provides an excellen t opportunity of 
viewing the d ifferen t conflictin g  aesthetic  conceptions, and o f  
seeing in  what way they f a i l  to present an adequate basis for a 
theory o f art*
Of the f iv e  misconceptions which Mr Groce examines he 
begins with empirical Aesthetic* This ooacaption i s  lim ited to  
the lev e l of aesthetic  or a r t is t ic  facts* These a r t is t ic  facts  
can be gathered together in  order to c la s s ify  them under d ifferent 
types* However, according to th is  school,such fa c ts  cannot be re­
duced to any one philosophical explanation* The log ica l ideal of  
th is  aesthetic i s  the cataloging method of zoology or botany*
The empirical aesthetic s ta te s  the fa ct that th is  i s  a work of 
art but i t  do >s not know what i t  i s  that explains th is  fact*
*This aesthetic", Croce w rites, "when asfeed what art i s ,  rep lies  
by indicating successively single facts and by sayings 'Art i s  
th is , and th is ,  and th is too i s  ar t, and so on indofin itoly*"16
^®Benedett© Croce, Aesthetic, pp, 571-403*
l6 Ib id„  pp. 371-372.
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The whole conception i s  determined h r th e  em pirical approach 
which admits the  p o s s ib il i ty  o f  an in f in i te ly  d if fe re n t number 
o f a r t i s t i c  fac ts*  •
The second A esthetic c la s s if ic a t io n  nroce terms practlc lsm * 
U© explains th a t  th is  conception i s  d istinguished  from the pre­
ceding, in  that, ’the aesth e tic  o r a r t i s t i c  fac ta  are not merely 
em pirical o r nom inallatle groupings to g e th er, bu t th a t  a l l  o f  
them possess a  common foundation.^? This common foundation i s  
pdaeed in  “the p ra c tic a l fo ra  of human activity**,a-® The various 
m anifestations of th is  a e s th e tic , he continues, have been ca lle d  
hedonistic  * u t i l i ta r ia n *  m r& Llstlc  and so on , according to  the 
p leasu re , usefulness or v ir tu e  of the a e s th e tic  fact*  These 
fa c ts  a re  therefore  considered in  terms of the e ffe c t which the 
aes th e tic  f a c t  say  be pu t to  use , th a t i s  to  say , according to  
the needs of the p a rtic u la r  human being* Such i s  the  ae s th e tic  o f 
p rac tic ian*  which p laces the  value of a r t  in  the p ra c tic a l benefit 
a tta in e d  through i t .
The th ird  a e s th e tic  school which Croce l i s t s  i s  the 
in te H e c tu a l is t .  In  th is  conception, a e s th e tic s  “recognises 
the  re d u c ib ili ty  of a r t i s t i c  fa c ts  to  philosophical treatm ent’1 
and “explains than  as p a rtic u la r  cases of lo g ic a l thought,
l W ,  p . 372.
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id en tify ing  beauty with in te l le c tu a l  tru th .# * " 19 He continues
to  s ta te  th a t  "for th i s  A esthetic, what i s  prised in  a r t ,  i s  
what i s  learned from i t# " 20 In the l ig h t of th is  conception, 
" a r t  would he •the whole mass o f easy and popular tru th s  j or i t  
would he a tra n s ito ry  form of science, a semi-solenc© and a 
semi-philosophy, preparatory to  the  superior and. p e rfec t fo ra  
of science and o f philosophy#"21 Thus th is  in te l le o tu a l ia t  
A esthetic  conceives a r t  to  be the veh icle  fo r in te l le c tu a l  
t ru th  and a d ire c t  moans of a tta in in g  knowledge* A rt i s  there ­
fore subjected to  d id ac tic  in tc lle e tu a lle ia  and a e s th e tic s  
becomes a manual fo r  pedagogy#
Mr Croco*s fourth  A esthetic i s  called  agnostio# The 
grounds for t h i s  A esthetic school springs from a negation of 
the v a l id i ty  of e ith e r  th© em pirical, the  p ra c tic a l or th e  
in te l le c tu a l  A esthe tics . I t  finds these conceptions too 
evidently  fa ls e  because " i t  is .* « lo th  to  admit th a t a r t  i s  a 
simple f a c t  of pleasure or pain, an exercise of v ir tu e , or a 
fragmentary sketch of science and philosophy#"22 On the con­
tra ry , th is  A esthetic  knows -that a r t  cannot bo resolved Into an 
em pirical conceptj i t  knows a ls o  " th a t pleasure and pain a re
18lM d ., p . 372#
2QIbid*
21Ibid*,  p. 373.
22Ib id ., p . 373.
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united  with a e s th e tic  a c t iv i ty  only Indirectly*  th a t  m orality
has nothing to  do -with art* th a t  i t  i s  impossible to  ra t io n a lis e  
art* as i s  the ease w ith science and philosophy* and to  prove 
i t  b eau tifu l or ugly with the a id  of reason*"2S I t  is  a t  th is  
po in t th a t  the  agnostic a e s th e tic  breaks down because i t  i s  un- 
ab le  to  say ifeat the p rinc ip le  o f a r t  is* The ; gnostic
aesth e tic  i s  content therefor® to  consider a r t  as unexplainable*
Up to  th is  po in t, Croce’ s analysis revea ls  the inade­
quacy of any of thess psoudo-aesthotics to  explain what a r t  is* 
Even h is  la s t  c la s s if ic a tio n  of m ystical A esthetic  shows the 
f u t i l i t y  o f attem pting to  explain  a r t  in  terms other than i t s  
own nature* According to  Croce, the m ystical A esthetic would 
consider a r t  as "the h ighest pinnacle of knowledge*"^* But
Croce poin ts out the absurdity  o f such an explanation* ’*How*M
h© aaka, "can a r t  ever be superior to  philosophy, i f  philosophy 
make a r t  i t s  ob jec t, th a t i s  to  say i f  i t  plao® a r t  beneath 
i t s e l f ,  in  order to  analyse and define Such con trad io tiea
leaves no ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r a m ystical theory  of a rt*
I t  i s  in  th is  order th a t S&* Croce c la s s if ie s  these fiv e  
erroneous schools o f aesthe tics*  However, in  re tro sp e c t i t
appears that Mr Croce’s classification is itso lf, based on the
25Ibid*,  p* 373*
24Ib id .,  p . 374*
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modem devision of science in to  th e  em pirical and the meta­
physical in  which th e  philosophy o f nature i s  taken fo r the  
em plrioal science* A® such, in  Mr Croce’s c la s s if ic a tio n , the 
philosophy of nature has been ignored as a possib le b a sis  fo r 
the theory of a rt*  Hewhere in  those fiv e  misconceptions does 
th e  philosophy o f nature en te r in to  consideration* In 
empiricism and p ra o tio ia a ,the ju s t i f ic a t io n  i s  on the em pirical 
lev e l of botany or psychology* In the in te l le e tu a l ig t  and 
m ystical oonoeptions the ju s t i f ic a t io n  derives from metaphysios 
and the  supernatural* Hone o f th ese , e ith e r  in  themselves, nor 
in  aay combination, a r e  capable o f dealing  with the  p rin c ip les  
of nature or of a rt*  Further examination of these various 
a e s th e tic  th eo rie s  d isc lo ses  th e  reasons why*
In  the f i r s t  p lace, th e  m ystical A esthetic dees not 
qu a lify  as a  v a lid  explanation o f a r t  because i t  confounds the
n a tu ra l sphere with th e  supernatural* True mysticism i s  rooted
26in  fa i th  and has i t s  end in  an inner growth o f contemplation*
I t  would be a con trad ic tion  fo r any a e s th e tic  to  p e rs is t  in  
claiming th a t  i t  obtained the n a tu ra l p rin c ip le s  of a r t  from the 
supernatural sphere o f ay stic isa*  A rt belongs to  the n a tu ra l 
order and to  confuse i t  w ith the  supernatural i s  wholly un­
reasonable*
2% ide Charles Journet, The Wisdom of F a ith , traas* , 
E .F .S aith , 3*J* (l® stm iaeter, 'Marylandi Hewnam #ress, 
pp. 5-13*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 7
to  the other hand, the em pirical A esthetic considers 
a r t  to  be another kind of phenomena* A ll a r t i s t i c  fa c ts  are 
evaluated according to  observable o h a rae te ris tie s*  By re ­
fusing to  take in to  account the in te l l ig ib le  or transcen­
den ta l aspect o f a r t .  I t  f a i l s  to  se e  the in tr in s ic  p rin c ip le s  
o f a rt*  The em pirical A esthetic , in  d e l in g  the  p o ss ib il i ty  
o f a philosophical basis ,suggests  th a t there i s  no fundamental 
i n t e l l i g ib i l i ty  to  a r t*  The purely descrip tive  reading of 
th is  A esthetic  finds i t s e l f  in  the paradoxical position  of 
f i l in g  and cataloguing and so rting  the various kinds of 
a r t i s t i c  f a c ts ,  e ith o u t knowing what i t  i s  th a t makes the f a c ts  
“a r t i s t i c ”.  The ch ie f c r itic ism  o f the  em pirical A esthetic  i s  
•this* i t  s to p s  short a t  a  m ateria l d e sc rip t ion of a r t i s t i c  
fa c ts  and considers th a t th is  i s  a l l  th ere  i s  to  be said  on 
the  subject o f a r t*  Such a presumption re fu te s  i ts e l f*  So 
m atter how w ell i t  describes the a r t i s t i c  f a c ts ,  d escrip tio n  
i s  always d esc rip tio n , and under no circumstances does i t  
become an explanation of a rt*
M Bugene Veron, a celebrated  aesthe tio ian  of the la te  
nineteenth oentury did not h e s ita te  to  show the short comings 
of the  empirical Aesthetic* Upon 'th is point he wrote* “Aes­
th e t ic s  i s  perforce lim ited  to  the  statem ent and re g is tra tio n  
of f a c ts ,  and to  th e ir  c la s s if ic a t io n  in  the order most 
probable* So fa r , then, i t  ceases to  be a science in  the
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ncomplete sense o f th e  wsrd.*2^ Bio em pirical As s th s tie  leaves 
the  p rino ip les o f a r t  unexplained.
Bor la  Hie A esthetic  o f praotiolsm  oapable o f answering 
our q u est. As we have seen, Hals conception judges a r t  In  
terms o f i t s  e f f e c t .  I t  contends th a t everyone, even the  most 
ph legaatic, admit a e s th e tic  pleasure to  be a  f a c t .  I t  cannot 
be denied because a l l  have f e l t  th a t  agreeable experience of 
s e n s ib ili ty  shea one contemplates something of eminent beauty. 
However, th is  a e s th e tic  f a l l s  to  see th a t  th is  experience i s  
e s se n tia lly  a  byp ro d u ct, an e f fe c t  of the work. To make th is  
a e s th e tic  t h r i l l ,  the  very basis of a r t  i s  to  p i t  undue s tre s s  
upon fee lin g  and to  ignore th e  work of a r t .  I t  i s  indeed a  
l i t t l e  lopsided to  consider the  e f fe c t  a s  primary, without 
considering th e  work of a r t  which to  begin w ith , makes the  
a e s th e tic  p leasure p o ss ib le . For th is  school, the value of a r t  
i s  dependent so le ly  upon the  p leasurable e f fe c t  which i t  i s  
capable o f arousing . Consequently, a r t  i s  oonoeived as a  th e ra ­
peutic  means o f re s to rin g  people to  a  s ta te  o f equilibrium  and 
emotional harmony. In  th i s  p ra o t le ls t  A esthetic , a r t  i s  only 
good when i t  i s  serving a p ra c tic a l purpose, whatever i t  may be.
The fb u lt of th is  a e s th e tic  theory i s  ra th e r p a ten t.
An a e s th e tic  which i s  based on so decep tive  a  phenomena as 
emotional or psychological e ffe c ts  i s  l e f t  open to  the eharge
27Iugene Veron, A esthetics, brans. Vf.H. Armstrong (London* 
Chaapman and H all, 18?&), p . 'V i.
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of subjeetiviaB* A rt has a© objective value, I t  i s  e n tire ly  a  
m atter of indiv idual caprioe* A esthetic  gractio ism  re v e rts  to  
the emotional value o f a r t  and to  whatever a ss  th is  e f fe c t  m y  
bo put* This a e s th e tic  o f p ra c t ic ia n  A e th e r  i t  deals with 
a e s th e tic  fa c ts  or w ith the  psychological reac tion  to  these 
f a c ts , i s  always accentuating the merely em pirical and descrip­
t iv e  character o f  a r t*  She question of th e  p rino ip les o f a r t  
s t i l l  goes unanswered*
■ Moreover, the  la te l le o tu a l la t  A esthetic  id e n tif ie s  a r t  
with in te l le c tu a l  tru th *  I t  r a t io n a lis e s  a r t  in to  a minor fo ra  
o f s c ie n t if ic  or philosophic knowled gj demanding of a r t  the same 
tru th s  which a re  given by the  n a tu ra l sciences and metaphysics* 
But ra tio n a l knowledge i s  pecu liar to  th e  philosopher and the 
s c ie n t is t  and no t to  the  a r t i s t*  "The a c t iv i ty  of a r t ,*  says 
M M aritain, " is  not in  i t s e l f  an a o t iv i ty  o f knowledge bu t of 
ereatiom j a r t  a sp ire s  to  c rea tin g  an ob jec t in  accordance w ith 
the ob jec ts inner needs and i t s  own good*"28 f© e laborate  a 
theory o f a r t  on an in te l le c tu a l!  s t  foundation would be to  
eonfus© making w ith knowing* Kant i s  Idle h is to r ic a l  example 
o f t h i s  position*
F ina lly , there  i s  the agnostic  A esth e tic . More than 
any of the previous a e s th e tic  conceptions th is  agnostio theory  
po in ts the m y  to  the tru e  philosophical b a sis  of a rt*  So
28 Jacques Mari ta in , She Range o f Reason (leer York* 
Scribner* 1952), p* 17* (Only'in 'K g l l iK 1 e d itio n )*
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repea t what Mr Croce k i  said* th i s  a e s th e tic  kaowa th a t a r t  
cannot he resolved in to  an em pirical concept. I t  shows th a t 
p leasure i s  united  w ith the a e s th e tic  a c t iv i ty  only in  an in ­
d ire c t  manner* I t  r e a l is e s  th a t  morality* as such, has nothing 
to  do w ith a r t*  I t  a lso  sees the  im possib ility  o f r a t io n a l is ­
ing a r t ,  a s  i s  th e  case w ith the  em pirical and in te l le c tu a l  
aesthetlo ians*  In sho rt, i t  c le a r ly  sees the  f u t i l i t y  of 
bu ild ing  an a e s th e tic  e ith e r  on the double foundation of meta­
physical and em pirical p rin c ip le s  or on the  single foundation of 
an a rb itra ry  s e t  o f princip les#  Will® re je c tin g  these  th eo rie s , 
i t  d iscovers th a t  a r t  w ist have i t s  own p rin c ip le s  and origin* 
but ju s t  what these a re  i t  cannot say#
th is  frank  adm ission o f fa i lu re  to  s ta te  the  p rin c ip le s  
of a r t  i s  th e  most honest approach made by these various pseudo- 
ae s th e tic  theories*  I t  stems from a re a lis a tio n  th a t  a r t  has 
i t s  cm  p rin c ip le s  * but th a t  th e  agnostic  school lacks th e  
proper philosophical b a s is  whereby to  e labo rate  a theory o f a rt*  
Irem the consideration of these various a e s th e tic  con­
ceptions Mr Groce proceeds to  e labo rate  h is  own doctrine o f 
a e s th e tic s , keeping in  mind the  inadequacies o f these  previous 
positions* He c a l ls  h is  doctrine * the  a e s th e tic  of pure 
in tu itio n *  dust what th is  means Mr Crooe s ta te s  in  the follow­
ing way*
"H itherto, in  a l l  attem pts to  define  th e  place of
a r t ,  i t  has been sought, e ith e r  a t  the s m t i t  o f
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the th e o re tic  s p i r i t ,  s te m  philosophy, o r, a t  le a s t ,  
ia  the e ire le  of philosophy I t s e l f . . . * .  Why not in­
v e r t  the attem pt and instead  of forming th e  hypothesis 
th a t  ■'art ia  one o f th e  summits o r the  h ighest grade 
o f  - the  th e o re tic ' s p ir i t’, ' '''|’or'',W® ''rary  'opposite 
hypothesis, namely th a t  I t  i s  one o f  the lower grades,
e r the  lowest o f a l l t  • • • I f .................................................. .
three forma f  n a tu ra l or positive  Science,’ h is to ry  and 
Philosophy] i t  swat he declared in fe r io r ,  th a t i s  to  
say, le s s  complex than -the n a tu ra l Sciences, in  so 
f a r  a s  i t  i s  a lto g e th er wit£onC^Hs^amHonfl• In so 
fa r  as i t  i s  w ithout conceptual determ inations and 
does not d is tin g u ish  between the  r e a l  and the  u n rea l,,*  
i t  must be declared in fe r io r  to  H isto ry , In so fa r  
a s  i t  f a i l s  a lto g e th e r to  surpass the phenomenal 
world, and does no t a t ta in  to  the  d e fin itio n s  o f the  
pure concepts, i t  i s  in fe r io r  to  Billosophy i t s e l f . •• 
A rt i s  governed e n tir e ly  by imaginationj i t s  only 
r ich es  ere images* A rt does no t c la s s ify  objeots, 
nor pronounce titan r e a l  or imaginary, nor q u a lify  them, 
near define them* A rt fe e ls  and rep resen ts  them* 
nothing more. A rt therefor© i s  in tu i t io n .”28
On© oommentator has evaluated the negative a es th e tio  
conception witii singular exactitude#
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the th e o re tic  s p i r i t ,  above philosophy, o r , a t le a s t, 
in  the c irc le  of philosophy i t s e l f  ***** VSftiy no t In­
vert the attem pt and instead  o f f  ©rating th e  hypothesis 
that ;a rt 1# one o f th e  summits or the M u te s t grade 
of the th eo re tlio'l s p l r i t , l'lf o r 'We very opposite 
hypothesis, namely that I t  i s  one o f -the lo se r grades,
or the  lowest o f a l l f  we oompar s  A rt iri th  t b e  
three forms f  n a tu ra l o r . positive  Science, fcistory and 
Philosophy] I t  m a t  he declared in fe r io r , th a t i s  to  
m y,.. le s s  complex than the n a tu ra l Sciences, in  so 
fa r  a s  i t  i s  a ltoge ther without'"'aS1s ir  actions • In so 
fa r  a s  i t  ie  w ithout conceptual determ inations and 
does no t d is tin g u ish  between th e  r e a l  and -the u n re a l . . .  
i t  must he declared in fe r io r  to  l i a to r y .  In so fa r  
as  i t  f a l l s  a lto g e th er to  surpass the phenomenal 
world, ami does n o t a t ta in  to  the  d e fin itio n s  o f the  
pure concepts, i t  ie  in fe r io r  to  Philosophy i t s e l f . . .  
A rt i s  governed e n tir e ly  by im aglm ticsii i t s  only 
r ich es  are  images. A rt does no t c la s s ify  ob jec ts , 
nor pronounce them, r e a l  or i®aglnary, nor qua lify  them, 
nor define than . A rt fe e ls  and rep resen ts  then . 
Nothing mere. A rt therefo re  i s  in tu i t io n ."28
One oomraentator has evaluated the negative a e s th e tic
jption with singular exactitude*
"Benedetto Cr©oe»s d o c tr in e ..  .see®,® o f tan  to  
co n s is t of a  tau to logy hedged in  by negations.
A rt i s  a r t ,  and a r t  i s  no t m orality , re l ig io n , 
p o l i t ic s ,  t ru th , sensation, emotion, p leasure . 
Furtherm ore,' a r t  ie. a r t ,  and i t  i s  dance, music, 
a rc h ite c tu re , ly r ic ,  dram atic, eomie, tra g ic , 
only in  an inc iden ta l way. fhe inwardly oonoeived 
expression, th e  essence o f a r t ,  may be wedded to  
a l l  kinds o f conventions, b e lie f s ,  and m ateria ls 
and thus b® d iv e rs if ie d  in to  a  wealth o f indiv idual 
works. But th e  un iversal concepts of e s th e tic *  
find  no foothold in  th is  sphere of boundless e a r  
tingeaoy."30
Mr Croce, by id en tify in g  a r t  with in tu it io n , would
29Ib id .,  pp. 383-586.
s% . 1* G ilbert and Helmut Kuhn, A H isto ry  of A esthetics, 
p . S5S. '
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destroy  th e  f  ie ld  e n tire ly  lay in f in i te ly  extending i t s  lim its*  ta  
th is  regard , Mr Xrving Babbitt very w ell says th a t  »Th© fo rm !  
element i a  a r t  has vanished away wore and more, u n t i l  nothing has 
been l e f t  bu t pare ex p re ss io n .* ^  Croce*e a e sth e tic  conception, 
in stead  of giv ing an explanation of what a r t  i s ,  reduces a r t  to  
a  s ta te  o f non-en tity .
Vhat then out be concluded front the consideration o f these 
various pseudo-aesthetic conceptions?
they a l l  reveal th a t  a r t  lacks an adequate philosophical 
explanation e ith e r  when i t  i s  rooted in  metaphysics o r in  the 
em pirlolosdeal sc iences. I f  considered a branch of metaphysics, 
only the transcendental aspects o f  a r t  may be consideredj and i f  
a l l ie d  w ith physics or eiapiriological sc ience, a consideration of 
a r t  I s  lim ited  to  i t s  m ateria l m anifestations o r  the physical 
reac tio n s t o  these  m an ifesta tions. The agnostic Aesthetic c a l ls
suMu*wsisss»«ussi|">*
fo r  p rin c ip les  t u t  find® m  ph ilosophical b a s is  capable o f revealing  
what these might b e .
I t  w in  be the purpose o f the concluding chapter to  present 
the philosophy of nature a s  that philosophical basis  on which an 
adequate theojy of A esthetic say be founded.
^ I rv in g  B abb itt, The Sew Laokbon (Cambridge* U niversity 
P ress , 1910), p . 219. "rrn’“n
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ne tm u to m  m a t
Ar t  and the  Philosophy of Batura
«lli*aiiiineewa»*IS^ I ie>ieiaSWW»aaswmenMlW»l|ll«pw^ ^
Frea th e  preceding ehapter, I t  is  su ff ic ie n tly  evident th a t 
the w ry  beginning* of modern A esthetics baa i t s  source in  tits sub* 
3«#ii’ft»** of modern philosophy* Art* along; with MAtare, had been 
reduced to  a  purely subjective phenomenon* fo r th is  very reason* 
modern philosophy was unable t o  provide an adequate b a s is , s i tb s r  
fo r  a r t  or fo r i t s  critic ism *
I t  was beeausc of th is  fa i lu re  of modern p h il >*ephy to  account 
fo r th e  th e o re tic a l basis of a r t  tha t we undertook* in  our second 
chap ter, an examination of tb s  A ris to te lian  philosophy of nature* The 
one aspect of na tu ra l philosophy in  which we were p a rtie u la rly  in te r ­
ested  was the proseas of na tu ra l generation, for th is  i s  what a r t  i s  
said to  Im itate* We re la ted  the doctrine of generation whieh s ta te s  
th a t  the eosaing in to  being of n a tu ra l things involves th ree  necessary 
princip les*  These p rincip les are  being in  potency, which is  m atter, 
non-being in  net* which I s  p r iv a tio n , and th a t through which something 
offlBss-to-be in  set* whieh is  form* These p riae ip le s  of generation 
reveal th a t  everything whioh oomes la te  being does so fo r  the sake of an 
and, and an end is  th a t  whioh always appears as the f in a l re s u lt  of a 
development* This development i s  always in  accordance with na tu ra l
93
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p rin c ip le s , end by a  continuous proasso a tta in s  i t s  completion ia  
the term of generation, whieh la  a format nature* This la  the  praoaaa 
o f generation whieh takes plaee la  n a tu ra l things*
Moreover, both A ris to tle  and St Thomas point out tha p a ra llo l 
wbloh e x is ts  between na tu ra l and a r t i f i c i a l  g e n ra tio n . While fehay 
tasks a d is tin c tio n  between human making and na tu ra l generation! 
nevertheless, they recognise th a t the fsreeese of coning la te  being 
ia  common to  both* The example whioh they use most frequently  ia  
th e  a r t  of aaulftu rlag*  I t  la  In the Be P rln e lp lls  Baturas* th a t 
St Thoma speaks of the p rinc ip les  of generation as they a re  applied 
to  a rt*  When a sta tue  Is  sad# from bronse, the bronse whioh is  ia  
poteney to  the fo ra  o f the s ta tu e  is  the m atter* the shapeless and 
undisposed prizseiple is  the ^ fix a tio n , and the  shape, because i t  ia  
ca lled  a s ta tu e , i s  the form* But i t  fhoaas eautlons th a t the form 
of the  s ta tu e  is  not the same as th e  su b s ta n tia l fora ia  the na tu ra l 
sense* fho bronse, before i t  receives the  fora of the  s ta tu e , has 
existence already in  s e t ,  and i t s  ex istease  does not depend upon 
th e  shape of the  s ta tu e  whieh is  r e a l ly  only an acciden tal form*
Be, therefore* poin ts out tha t a l l  a r t i f i c i a l  forms a re , philosoph­
ic a lly  speaking, acc iden ta l and th a t a l l  human a r t  operates only on 
th a t which Is already constitu ted  in  existence by nature*
While for A riatotle and St Thomas, art is certainly distlog-
l St fhoaas Aquinas, *De F rin s ip iis  Baturas, Opuscule XXI” in  
SUfflM. Philosophies aoeedunt praooipua eiusdea dacto ris phllosophloa 
Qjmaouia^  ''"'^fsa'Iguier "and'g*' ' 6or m r~
Strand (P arisi L* G irard, n*d«), p . #0®*
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uished from m tu re , y e t l ik e  nature i t  p o rta las  to  a ce rta in  kind
of eomiag in to  beingi
#**with con triv ing  and eonaidering bee something nay eons in to  
being whieh ie eapabie o f being or ne t being , and whose o rig in  
is  in  the  » k « r  and not in  the th ing madei fo r a r t  Is  eenoerasd 
ra th e r with th ings th a t a re , or some in to  being by neoessity , 
not with th ings th a t do ee in  seeordaaee w ith natu re , sines 
these have th e ir  o rig in  in  themes 1 *ea#8
This e i ta t io n  c le a rly  shows the generative proeess common to  both
nature and a r t*  natu ra l objects hate th e ir  prins ip le  of action
frem the nature o f th ings) the  fe rn  o f  the a r t  i f  ex comes t#  i t
from the wind of the  a r t i s t  who Imposes th is  form on su itab le
m ate ria l.
The produote o f a r t• • • re q u ire  the  pre-existenee of an e f f ie le n t  
eause, homogeneous w ith them selves, eueh as the  s ta tu a ry 's  a r t ,  
whieh oust n eeessa rlly  precede th e  s t a t u e . . . .  Art indeed 
co n sis ts  in  the eoneeptloa of the  re s u l t  to  be produced before 
i t s  re a liz a tio n  in  the  Material#**
St Thomas adopts the same viewpoint in  the Do P rla o lp lls  Naturae*.
The p rin c ip le s  o f m atter, fo ra  and p riva tion  are in su ff ic ien t to
explain  generation* A s ta tu e , in  order to  be urodueed, needs an
agent in  order tha t the form might pass from p o te n tia lly  being the
sta tue  in  the  mind o f the a r t 1 s t , to  a c tu a lly  being i t  in  the  bronse.
The form e f the  th ing generated he c a l ls  the term of generation
because the form e x is ts  only in  th a t  whioh has been made to  be*
Thas what ie  made Is  in  the s ta te  of becoming as long as the
* A ris ta tic , Btl.ioa ileomachca. ll4GaiQ-16.
^ A ris to tle , De Partlbus Animallum, 84QaS0-SS*
*St Thomas Aquinas, ib id . ,  p . 410#
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th in g  is  ee*iag«be«fc** From th is  he concludes that i t  ie  necessary 
to  have besides the m atter Mid the to m , some princip le  which a c ts .  
This he c a l ls  the e f f ic ie n t ,  moving or agent cause,or from whence 
the p rin c ip le  of motion ie* A lso, lik e  A ris to tle , he affirm s 
th a t  everything whioh a c ts ,  does so only by intend 1% something. 
Consequently, I t  is  necessary that th e re  he some fourth  cause, 
th a t  i s  to  say, th a t whioh is  intended by the agen t. This he 
s a i l s  the end.
'fhie* then. Is  i t  Thomas* a s e p s i s  of the f a i r  causes whioh 
account fo r the coming in to  being o f th in g s . A s ta tu e , in  order to  
be produced, needs f i r s t  of a l l ,  something out o f whioh i t  i s  
produced, something whieh is  made in to  i t ,  as the bronze i s  made 
in to  a s ta tu e . This i s  the  m aterial cause or th e  m atter. The 
matter alone, however, cannot bee one the th ing  unless i t  receives 
a c e r ta in  form o r p a tte rn . The bronse m a t receive a c e r ta in  shape 
in  order to  besom a s ta tu e . The stru c tu re  or pa ttern  i s  the formal 
pause. But i t  ie not the nature of bronze to  shape I t s e l f  in to  a  
s ta tu e . The sculptor must a e t so as to  impart the proper form whieh 
be has in  h is  mind. This th ird  cause which «ov<?s the  m atter to  
receive the farm of the s ta tu e  to  be produced i s  the e f f ic ie n t  
pause, for the scu lp to r is  the e f f ic ie n t  cause to th e  s ta tu e .
F ina lly , even given the matter, the form and t  e efficient 
th is  p a rticu la r e ffe c t w il l  not be produced ra th e r  than seme o ther, 
in  fa c t tb s  e f f ic ie n t  cause w il l  not even begin to  a e t a t  a l l ,  unless 
there  i s  sens end or gsal aimed a t  in  the p rocess, something "for 
the safes o f  whioh* the  whole process takes p lace . With St Thcoaa*
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cmmplc t in  geed-te-be-afctained is. the  formed sta tue  and i t  i s  sad 
whioh determines the  a c t iv i ty  o f the th ree  f r i e r  causes* The end i s  
th e  f in a l cause*
1m  in  the process o f a r t i f i o i a l  things* a r t  is  nothing o ther 
then the r ig h t oonoeption whioh d ire c ts  the making of things*6 The 
fora  emanates free  the mind of the a r t i s t*  This fora i s  the  f r u i t  
of an in te l le c tu a l  process whieh began with Swages of the senses 
and by preceding experience* i s  mM  to  •generate" th is  winward word 
whioh belongs to  no n a tio n ’s speech*.® I t s e l f  instate r i e l ,  the  fo ra  
in  the a r t i s t ’ s mind is  the p rincip le  of generation* The scu lp to r 
who* th r  the  form of the sta tue  which he possesses in  h is mind 
is  able to  cause the s ta tu e  in  n a tte r*  The a r t  of sculp turing  i s
the  p rincip le  of movement whieh eon tr ib u te s  to  the pxo duetion o f the
e ffe c t by acting  upon the  bronse and moving i t  from p o ten tia l
possession of the form to  actual possession of i t*  The scu lp to r i s
the  e x tr in s ic  cause of the statue* while the  bronse i s  the  in tr in s ic  
cause* The form of the  s ta tu e  p re-ex isting  in  the a r t i s t ’ s in te l le c t  
and w il l  as the  end to  be a tta in e d  by h is  a rt*  i s  an e x tr in s ic  cause* 
iewever* the same form re a lise d  in  the bronse i s  an in tr in s ic  cause*7
6St Thomas Aquinas, Suama Sombre g c a t l i s t* X* 95 (T auria ii Marl- 
e t t i*  1933}* p* 84. " .. '.a re  e s l " ^ ^ ^ 1 r iitlo  'fae tlh ilium ”.
6St Thomas Aquinas* Sumaa Theologian* I*9S*7. ad 3*
^¥lde i t  Thomas Aquinas* In Metashysicam A risto telie  Oemrentaria*
XII* le a f*  3*4* ed. M.~H* Cat ^ l a rnSffaw lnli"^ ar 15^11* }*""ppT
690-695.
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This whole question a t  the  sowing 1st® being of things#
wither by nature or by a r t  weald# of soars*# adn&t at *er* develop*
w»n% than ie  possible hare* For the patien t#  what must ho brought
into fooua i t  the fast#  that bh# philosophy of mi****# of o i l  the
hranebss o# |ifeil >sophy, ie  the only eta© saftahls of explaining the
sussing In to  being o f natural things* :mrth*FEs©r«, fro*  our
e r s t im  of the  b io tua , *Ari im ita tes nature*# p a rtio u la rly  ia  the
JJ&st o te l iea»f m«?lsti® <MM*fbl«ft# wo wav* ab le  to  see the re la tio n
of a r t  to  its# philosophy of nature*
But# la  order to  im  the amp lo t#  of th is  diatius wo
Knot to m  to  two passage* l a  St fhssne* sowwabary o a th #  physios
of- *rt*%stl*» fhofo ho m k m  o s p l io l t  I to  unique meaning* At tho
•one tin*# fee presentsthe |w t i f l t o t l« a  fo r tho  philosophy of nature
as tho  th so re tie a l b a s is  for a  philosophy of a rt*
la  tbs fir s t e w iiitm tl'0 %  ho a s so r ts  th a t tho argument
fo r  tb s  st& tsssat *£rt l a i t a t s s  nature* is  as follow s«
Tbs y r lm if lo  of a r t l f l e i a l  operation  is  knowledge} bait a l l  of 
our knowledge i s  drawn frost sensib le  and na tu ra l th ings through 
sens#i tisne we prodneo a  likeness o f  natu ra l things* Therefore 
n a tu ra l biting* a re  Iwlbahl* %br#*tgjh a r t  beoause a l l  o f  nature i s  
ordered be lb s  end by #*** inbsllesblw e princip le#  so brat the* 
the ■work of nsbei*# sesas to  be a  work of In te ll i^ s a s s  to  th e  
extent tb a t  i t  yroeesd# % awards d e fin ite  eniSgby de ter mined 
meansI whlefe a r t  a lso  does in  i t s  operations*
i St fhonas iquiaas# In ooto Libras fhysloorws ir ls to te lls *  II# 
lest*  it*  #ijM  ante* "ratio" sat,""quia
prim ifim s e fs m t im ls  art I f  ie  ta i ls  sagn ltio  est* omis subs* nostra 
oogaltio eat per sensus a rebus seaslb ilihns at asturalibus aooepta# 
unis ad eim liltudlnsa naturaliu* la  a r tif ie la ilb u s  oyerassir* Idas 
eats* res aabaralss ia its b lls#  sunt per artes^ fsl*  ab aliqu© prla* 
elp lo  intoilootiw o to ts  nature erdiaatur ad fine* sou*, at s i s  eyas 
naturae vldsaier esse  egna* intellifprntiae, dun per deb»rain*ta media
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In th is  argom tit, St Thorn* miens thro* nlgnifioaist point*
oonoorntog th* **j*#r*ilw pro*#** nf a r t*  4 f t  has, f i r s t  o f o i l ,
to* s w a n  of i t s  a c t iv i ty  in  t»w*i*4i* whioh Is  gained o rig in a lly
from thn sons ib is  world. Art is  *no«mdly,a yvsdusttm  or oassndsrlac
n a tiv ity  which produce* » ilkonos* to  natu ra l things* And th ird ly*
th is  c rea tiv e  a c t iv i ty  of a r t  IM ta to s  to  i t s  mn spharo, thn
produotlvn n a tiv ity  whioh in ohftr*ot«rlotlo o f na tu ra l generation*
Both prssooi in  th s l r  generative pro****** towards d n f to lts  m is
(thn fyraod as tu rn  or the  for* i a  ton wind «f ton a r t i s t )  by a
dot*rained m ans {thn s a t t s r  whereby thn to m  of g«»oratio® is  a
nature fo rm d or a work of a r t  proffered)*
to  th is  w ry  {mint, 1  Marl ta la  has a  oapifeai te x t which,
despite  I t s  leng th , must bn tpnbnd horn to  ardor to  bring to  lig h t
tb s  action  th a t a r t  i s  by i t s  vary nssnnan frodw stlve, and th a t i t
la  th is  a c t iv i ty  to  whioh thn to is to to lton*fbow istio  ac tio n  of
im itation  owns I t s  reantog*
£*s& i l  s u i t  f »  l*art*  to u t on n tan t produetif par ossoaoo* 
suppose tonjettr* oa »«««% is  o c*t m plab ioa, n t l*o*uvre 4* a r t  
um  w liad l* , o*ost4k«iiis mi sons animateur 4*un* form * 3»e*t 
la-dnssus gn*Arl*tot* so fo ad a it pour declarer l im i ta t io n  
inherent* I  l ’a r t i  no f i t *  9m m  l»iii41fo« bina os so t  l i m i ­
ta t io n , ee rapport® 4*aber4 s t  a»l«s in  p lan  in  v ia ib U it#  Is  
flias apparent ***« uno «-om»i»«aaoo (*p4e**iati**) prealabl* I  
i* a c tiv iic  4*01% a t gi^sugpos^n gar s i l o ,  m is  sx trinsn tuo  a  
o i l s i  a  la  oonnaiasamoi a  tou tn s ton eorjnairean**, a touts* 
lo t  som aitseae*  ordinaire# ^  I ’howae quo 1’a r t i s t e  so p reso rt 
on ouvraat nos yeux a t  son ia tc liig o n e*  our ins efce*** da woods 
o t in  la  cu ltu re*  L’a o tiv ite ' d*art eoawsnno* apron onto, pares> nfi i Mini mint ~
ad certs*  fin es  preoodit* quod a t  law to  Cjwraado are to i ta tu r ,*  
English t ra n s la tio n , 1* A* eofcourefe, t o  ta trednatlon  to  thn Phil* 
°*°US to tu re  (St* fowl, Mtoreaota™n’&’rtS n cbntreT T ress,"“i M f f ,
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$«« e*e#t use aet i r i t e o r e a t r l e #  # t $»*, do *o i{ e li#  deaande 
•  1*esp rit#  non |* r  4*otre ferae f a r  ua» oaoe* a  ooanattre ,
M i*  4* tu rn er use o t o , * i t oM r dans W ire*®
flii*  predaotive a e tlv ity , e h a rm te r ls t ie  of art,snap#* soaathing
in  exi«t#B»#f instead  or being «h*g>*4 by things* Tho shaping* i f
th#  a r t is t*  &f eeeethia*; in to  «visfc»na# (&wm&m quid) follows
th* **m 0 tm *m  m £  p rineip le*  of n a tu ra l generation* M HwpiMin
i t  here r e i te ra t in g  fm  the  otmte&perary nlnd# the sense in  whioh
th# &viebote1iam -m egletie  notion of ia& betios has to  be understood*
I t  eaisnei h# takes i a  i t#  su ^ e rf io ie l m i  popular neanin£ of «
e e rv lie  eopy of th® sensible* rather#  i t  m»% pase fro*  th is  eap irio e l
lows! to  th® le e e l o f th*  alnd *h#re a r t  ia# ia  I ts e lf*  * s p ir i tu a l
a e t lv l ty  whieli ha* It*  m i  i a  th# prom otion of * fora* I t  is  th i*
engendering a s t i r i t y  of the  wind whioh# p o f# .fiy  speaking, oe&sti*
tu te*  th# inherent swaning of the ton# '*^»ibatt®»‘, in  a r t*  I t  1*
in  vlrtsm  of th i#  eagswleriiig a e t lv i ty  whieh ands in  tho produet ion
Of *  work of a r t ,  th a t  a r t  ie  s a i l  to  la i ta t#  tho prodnative n a tiv ity
Of SAfiM*
Sot a t theses* eeneldefatlens o f tho  diotua ’‘Art im ita tes
nature* 4* not otop hero* In foot the d ie tu a  resolve* fro»  tho
Angel ia Dooter « seneldextable eafaoelw* whioh fo r our purposes ie
of p r im  iefortonoo* i t  rhenas, keeping ia  Mad the v a lid ity  of tho
notion  of im ita tion , e stab lish es th i*  p e rtin en t ooneluslea*
A rt im itate* nature* therefore# natural seieae* should he to  
na tu ra l things* a* a r t i f i o i a l  seienee i s  to  a r t i f i e i a l  things*
But the erne a r t i f i e i a l  seiease  know* th# w itte r  end fe rn  «f
&daeeue* et istsaa wwritaia* situation Cm Im Poesie (fariai 
Peeelee# im ) »  m* 100*101*
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nbe « m  d e fin ite  termf fo r  exa?3ple*.*the Guilder considers the 
fo ra  o f tho house as n o i l  as tho b risks and wood whioh are tho 
n a tte r  of tho house, and i t  i s  tho sane in  a l l  tho o ther a rts*  
therefore i t  belongs to  the sam  natural seioneo to  knew both 
the  for® and tho natter**®
In th to  passage St themes, in  v irtu e  o f the  analogous re la tio n  
whieh e x is ts  between a r t  and nature , e s tab lish es  tho ju s t if ic a t io n  
o f a philosophy of a r t  based on the p rin c ip le s  of the philosophy of 
nature* fho p rin c ip les  o f n a tu ra l generation when transposed in to  
the  sphere of the philosophy of a r t  a re  able to account fo r a r t i f i c i a l  
generation, in  the  sane way. t h a t . they do ia  I s na tu ra l philosophy* 
the  philosophy of a r t  w ill  be ab le , th ere fo re , to  employ the  same 
p rin c ip le s  o f naderstsndlxtg a r t i f i c i a l  th in g s , as the philosophy of 
nature uses ia  order to  understand natu ra l things* la  o ther words, 
Ju s t  as in  the  philosophy of na tu re , p rise  n a tte r  and su b s tan tia l 
fo ra  are  to  be conceived o f , a s  the  two oo-pri«oi .le s  whioh c o n sti­
tu te  a complete bodily substance) so a ls o , but in  an analogous 
fash ion , l a  the philosophy of a r t ,  whore a r t i f i c i a l  th ings a re  
constitu ted  as works of a rt*
Jaoreever* la  th e  n a tu ra l o rder,a  liv in g  body i s  generally
*11%
: St fhoaas Aquinas, In s e ts  L itres  Phyaioorua, I I ,  iv* "Are
im ita to r nature** ©pertebmlglCC«i1,'"Jpol' el#  ' so jS a ttit sa leab le  n a tu r-
a i l s  e lre a  n a tu ra lia , slou t so habet so le n tia  a r t i f i c i a l I s  e ire a  
a r t l f i e i a l i a ,  sod ejusde* so len tlae  a r t i f lo ia U s  se t eognoseere 
nateriSffi o t fornam usque ad allqucm ocrtua  te ra ln u a i s lo u t medicos 
oognoeoit s a n i ta te s  u t forma®, e t  cholera® « t phlegms e t  hujuamodl 
s lou t materia®, ia  qua se t san itas*  law la  oonteaperatione humorun 
san lta s  consist i t*  Et s im ili te r  a e d if le a te r  oonsiderat formam 
domes e t  la  te re s  e t  lig a a , quae sunt m ateria demos i e t  i t a  s e t  in  
oanibus a l i i s  a r t lb u s i  ergo ejusdem seleobloe n a tu ra lia  ea t oogno- 
soere te a  materia® qua® forma®**
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nunderstood to  bo more than a co llec tio n  or composite of parts*  A 
liv in g  body is- something more thou the  sum of i t s  parts* where 
"something ever*. something, substan tia l*  something other than  tho 
bodywotmotnro* scmsthiag whioh smkts tho body iivo* fho doctrine 
of hylomorphlam holds th a t tho l i f e  p rin c ip le  .in a liv in g  body i*  
tho su b s tan tia l fo ra  of that body* I t  Ie  on active  and determining 
su b s tan tia l p rin c ip le  which eoMhow u n ifie s  in  s tru c tu re  end function 
the  various d iffe re n t ports* end make* one organic subetance of the 
whole* sim ilar!ly*  i a  the  a r t i f i c i a l  order* the  «i m  holds, true* 
but' In  a secondary way* When the fo ra  in  the  a r t is t* *  mind has been 
imposed en the  proper n o ta r ia l ,th e re  re s u lts  a  "b rillla jss*  of fora" 
shining on the appropriate m ate ria l, the. parts  are  organically  
linked to  the whole and the p rincip le  of coherence is  the font*
This p rin c ip le  of order extends i t s  con tro l over each d e ta i l  of the  
ensemble* giving, the  work an a r t i s t i c  dynamics of i t s  own.
Mae Hafasa M aritain, an exponent ef th is  philosophy of a r t  
whioh acquires i t s  energising p rin c ip le s  from na tu ra l philosophy* 
makes use of the hylomorphle theory to  e lucidate  the  nature of 
poetry* In her essay* e n ti t le d  Sens e t  Hoarsens en Poetic* she 
writes*
ie  sens pootlqu* *e e oaf end avee la  pass is  elle-mem*. Si 
j*ample!* l e i  1’expression sens podtique p lu td t que 1c mot 
poesic* o 'e s t  pour marquer que la  podsie f a i t  d tr*  1* poem* 
comm* I* Am* f a i t  I t  re  le  eerps* en chant la  fa r  me (en laagage 
a r is to tb  H elen ) ou H ide* (ea langage spine ;.lsf*T de ce corps* 
en lu i  doanant uns s ig n if ic a tio n  substan tia lle*  un seas ante* 
logique. Os sens p e 4 tlq u e ...e s t su b s tan tle lieaen t l ie  a  la  
forms* immancat a  1’organism* de acts* immanent a la  form* 
p o e tiq u e .ll
^Jaoque* e t  Rafssa JSarltain, ib id .*  pp. 13-14.
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is
This i s  a  good example of na tu ra l philosophy providing a philosophy 
of a r t  w ith tho p rinc ip les  capable of explaining tho dynamisst of 
poetry* Such p rin c ip le s  de a e t ra t io n a lis e  a r t  because they provide 
the philosophical b asis  fo r an understanding of what poetry It*  i a  
i t s e l f *  A philosophical explanation of poetry i s  possib le th ere ­
fo re , i f  i t  i s  given in  terms of th e  p rincip les of the philosophy 
of nature* There need be no fear of the ra tio n a lis a tio n  of poetry 
because these p rin c ip le s , when transposed to  the  universe of a r t ,  
give an explanation of the d is tin c tiv e  being of poetry* The theo­
re t ic a l  p rin c ip le s  of Matter and forts, when applied to  poetry , do 
n e t prejudice the nature of the work to  be done) m  th e  contrary , 
they provide th e  m ans fo r an In te l l ig ib le  understanding of poetry 
and of i t s  e r i t i s l s n ,  without jeopard ising  the  d is tin c tiv e  l i f e  of 
e ith e r  one*
nmy contemporary aes th e tic ia n s  r e a l is e  the need fo r these 
p rin c ip le s  o f n a tte r  and fo ra  in  order to  explain  works of a rt*  
but what they f a i l  to  see in  th e i r  use o f these p r in c ip le s , is  th a t 
they derive th e i r  unique sign ificance  fro*  the  philosophy o f nature* 
Professor T. M. Greene, in  h is  work. The Arte, and the  Art o f c r i t i c I sm, 
i s  ty p ic a l of th is  approach to  a r t*  In a painstaking analy sis  o f the 
te rn s  % a tte r” and "fora* as they a re  applied to  the s ix  aa je r a r t s ,  
he consisten tly  uses the tom e as the two most general categories 
in to  whioh a l l  a r t  m y be reduced* fo r  him, they are  purely 
lo g ica l in  conception, and descrip tive  in  Meaning. "Fom ", he defines, 
"ae the expressive organisation  o f n a tte r4* and "Matter” as “th a t
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1 9whioh ha* been expressly  organised** Sowhere ia  h is  exposition  
does ha r e a l i  so iha  philosophical im plication whioh the philaeophy 
of nature g ives to  those terms* Canseqswntly his and ysis of a r t  
ra re ly  r i s e s  above the level of description*
Fro* the fan* go lag considerations, i t  is  evident th a t the 
philosophy of nature ean q rn lify  as that th ee re tio  se ism s  es whioh 
to  base a  philosophy of a rt*  I t  therefo re  remains for eontemporary 
Thar. 1ste to  elaborate  aa A esthetic whieh would be engrafted en the  
A ris to te lian  philosophy of nature* Suefe a philosophy of a rt*  knowing 
vrtat e en e titubes th e  being of a r t i s t i e  working w ill  be able to  my* 
w ithout prajudioing the work t o  be done* what a work of a r t  ought to  
be* and thereby give to  the  poet and the o r i t i e  a lik e  the philosophical 
p r im ip le s  whieh both poetry and o r i t i e  la s  possess*
11
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1990 The author* Ambrose 0* P* Malnnes* was born o f I r is h  uid 
S co ttish  parentage a t  London, Ontario* on the  21*t o f
April#
1999 Ths author*s primary edueatien woo begun « t St Mary**
Separate School sad was completed a t  St martin* s Separate 
School* London*
i9H  fho author entered Be La Sail® High School* sonduoted by 
tho C hristian  Brothers and five  years la te r  m atricu lated . 
Baring th is  period ho p artic ip a ted  in  various drama fa s t i*  
vals and o ra to r ic a l contests* In 1947 he eon a regional 
award fo r public speaking* I t  was a t  th is  time* th a t  he 
developed a great lik ing for painting*
1949 Bating shown saw  progress in  his a r t is t ic  endeavours* tbs 
anther attended summer schools during the next th ree  
summers* the University of western Ontario, 19461 the  Uni* 
v a r s i ty . of Western Ontario* 194?f and the Banff school of 
Pine Art* 1948* It was at th is  l a t t e r  summer session  th a t  
the author sold hio f ir s t  painting* It was bought by th e  
Canadian national Railway*.
1949 In tho autumn of th is  year* tho author reg is te red  in  the
Liberal Arts course a t  Assumption College* Windsor* Ontario*
I960 the  author was priv ileged  to  make th e  Holy Year Pilgrimage 
to  Rons and to  a s s i s t  a t  the euaaer sessions of the  Univer­
s i ty  of Fribourg* Swibaerlaad*
1999 A fter having successfu lly  completed the Degree of Bachelor 
of .Arts* th e  author eoeaeneed post-graduate e tud iee in  
philosophy a t  Assumption College* the  same year he was 
•awarded a norld  U niversity  se rv ice  Scholarship* Thie 
e n ti t le d  b ln  be a ttend  an in te rn a tio n a l seminar a t  th e  
un iversity  of Leiden, Belland, and to  take pa rt in  an 
UffiJSCO confer®aed a t  .Delft* Holland.
1968 The author returned to  Assumption to  begin work on hie 
beater** thee ls*
1964 The required  th e s is  was completed In  May*
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